

The Department of State

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Vol. XXX, No. 769

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Intervention of International Communism in the Americas

Following is the text of a statement made by Secretary Dulles at Caracas, Venezuela, on March 5, immediately after a plenary session of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, together with statements made by Mr. Dulles during the March 8 and March 11 sessions of the Politico-Juridical Committee and the text of the declaration adopted by the Committee on March 13.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 5

The Guatemalan Foreign Minister [Guillermo Toriello] has made clear that he opposes any declaration by this Conference against international communism. Not only does he oppose any new action but also he goes further and says that his Government considers invalid prior resolutions for which his Government voted at the Ninth Inter-American Conference in 1948 and at the fourth meeting of American Foreign Ministers in 1951. By these resolutions the American States unanimously condemned international communism as incompatible with the concept of American freedom and as a danger for the American States.

We do not intend to let this issue be obscured by an abusive attack made upon the United States. We deplore the fact that this inter-American meeting should be used as a platform for efforts which seek to defame other American States and to exploit every possible difference with a view to disrupting the harmony of our gathering.

Guatemala's position with respect to intervention of international communism in the American Republics will be put to the test when this agenda item is taken up.

We are confident this Conference will reaffirm the position of the Ninth Conference on this question and will go on to declare that domination and control of political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement would constitute intervention by a foreign political power and be a threat to the peace of America.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 8

Press release 121 dated March 8

The United States has introduced a resolution under the agenda item "Intervention of International Communism in the American Republics." Our proposal is before you.

Its preamble first recalls the prior resolutions finding international communism to be a threat and then records our judgment that this threat still persists.

The first operative portion declares that, if the international Communist movement should come to dominate the political institutions of any American State, that would be a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of us all, endangering the peace of America and calling for appropriate action.

In accordance with existing treaties, the second operative portion calls for disclosures and exchanges of information, which would expose and weaken the Communist conspiracy.

What is international communism? In the course of the general debate, one of the Foreign Ministers (the Minister of Guatemala) asked, "What is international communism?" I thought that by now every Foreign Minister of the world knew what international communism is. It is disturbing if the foreign affairs of one of our American Republics are conducted by one so innocent that he has to ask that question.

But since the question has been asked, it shall be answered. International communism is that far-flung clandestine political organization which is operated by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Since 1939, it has brought 15 once independent nations into a state of abject servitude. It has a hard core of agents in practically every country of the world. The total constitutes not a theory, not a doctrine, but an aggressive, tough, political force, backed by great resources, and serving the most ruthless empire of modern times.

Declaration of Caracas

*Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention*¹

WHEREAS:

The American Republics at the Ninth International Conference of American States declared that international communism, by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, and resolved to adopt within their respective territories the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent subversive activities;

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recognized that, in addition to adequate internal measures in each State, a high degree of international cooperation is required to eradicate the danger which the subversive activities of international communism pose for the American States;

The aggressive character of the international communist movement continues to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States, and to the right of each State to develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs by other States;

THE TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE,

I

CONDEMNS the activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs;

EXPRESSES the determination of the American States to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism, acting in the interests of an alien despotism; and

REITERATES the faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy

as the best means to promote their social and political progress; and

DECLARES:

That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of measures² in accordance with existing treaties.

II

RECOMMENDS:

That without prejudice to such other measures as they may consider desirable, special attention be given by each of the American governments to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting the subversive activities of the international communist movement within their respective jurisdictions:

1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities and sources of funds of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf; and

2. The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Foreign Ministers regarding international communism.

3. *This declaration of foreign policy made by the American Republics in relation to dangers originating outside this Hemisphere is designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own form of government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.*³

¹ Presented by the U.S. delegation to the Tenth Inter-American Conference on Mar. 6; adopted by the Politico-Juridical Committee, as amended, on Mar. 13 by a vote of 17-1 (Guatemala), with Mexico and Argentina abstaining.

² Amendment introduced by Colombia; the original draft read "appropriate action."

³ Amendment introduced by the United States.

Most of the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party appear before the eyes of the world as responsible officials of the Soviet Government. In this capacity they conduct relations with the other Governments through the traditional institutions of diplomacy. But at the same time they operate and control this worldwide clandestine political organization to which I have referred.

Until the Second World War, Moscow's control over this organization was exercised openly through the central headquarters of the Communist International, the so-called "Comintern." That was a political association to which all of the Communist parties belonged and it had its seat in Moscow. During the war the Comintern was officially abolished. Since that time the control over the foreign Communist parties has been exer-

cised by the Moscow leaders secretly and informally, but for the most part no less effectively than before.

As proof of this fact one does not need to search for the precise channels through which this control proceeds, although some of them in fact are known. If one compares Soviet propaganda with the political positions taken by individual Communist officials and agents around the world, both from the standpoint of substance and timing, it becomes clear, beyond possibility of doubt, that there is this highly disciplined hierarchical organization which commands the unquestioned obedience of its individual members.

The disciplinary requirements include a firm insistence that loyalty to the movement, which means in effect loyalty to the leaders of the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union, shall take precedence over every other obligation including love of country, obligation to family, and the honor of one's own personal conduct.

These conclusions are not speculation; they are established facts, well known to all who have seriously studied the Communist apparatus.

The fact that this organization exists does not mean that all members of all Communist parties everywhere are conscious of its existence and of their relationship to it. Only a small proportion of Communist Party members are initiated into complete awareness of the nature of the movement to which they belong and the real sources of its authority. Most national Communist parties masquerade as normal patriotic political parties, purporting to reflect indigenous political impulses and to be led by indigenous elements.

Actually, every one of these parties represents a conspiracy within a conspiracy; the rank-and-file members, while serving the purpose of duping others, are to a considerable extent duped by their own leaders. The leaders do not reveal fully to the rank and file either the nature of their own allegiance or the sources of their own authority and funds.

The overall purpose for which this organization is maintained and operated is to act as an instrument for the advancement of the worldwide political aims of the dominant group of Moscow leaders.

This, then, is the answer to "What is international communism"?

It may next be asked whether this international Communist apparatus actually seeks to bring this hemisphere, or parts of it, into the Soviet orbit. The answer must be in the affirmative.

I shall not here accuse any government or any individuals of being either plotters or the dupes of plotters. We are not sitting here as a court to try governments or individuals. We sit rather as legislators. As such, we need to know what will enable us to take appropriate action of a general character in the common interest. Therefore, I shall confine myself to presenting well-established facts of that character.

When the Comintern was operating openly, it trained at Moscow, largely in the Lenin School, numerous persons from the Americas. Some of them are still active.

International Front Organizations

There was a special Comintern headquarters, and there were secret field offices which controlled and supported Communist activities in Latin America. The Comintern also developed a series of international front organizations designed to enable its agents to get popular backing from special groups such as labor, youth, women, students, farmers, etc. These front organizations also served as cover for the Soviet intelligence services.

When the Soviet Communist Party went

through the form of abolishing the Comintern, these same front organizations were carried on in a different form, with headquarters shifted from Moscow usually to satellite capitals. The Communist International of Youth emerged as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, with headquarters in Budapest, and as the International Students Union, with headquarters in Prague. There is the Women's International Juridical Association. There is the World Peace Council, located in Prague. There is the World Committee Against War and Fascism. Most powerful of all is the World Federation of Trade Unions, seated under Soviet auspices in Vienna. There is the All Union Society for Cultural Relations Abroad which channels propaganda through its local outlets, the various Soviet friendship societies.

These front organizations carry on important activities in many of the American States. Their members in this hemisphere go back and forth to the Soviet bloc countries, using funds which are supplied by the Soviet Communist Party.

The basic facts I outline are well known. They could be supplemented by masses of detail, but that is unnecessary for our present purposes. It is enough to know that international communism operates strongly in this hemisphere to accomplish the political purposes of its leaders who are at the same time the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and of the Soviet Union.

International communism is not liberating but enslaving. It has been suggested that, even though the international Communist movement operates in this hemisphere, it may serve a liberating purpose, compatible with principles of our American States. Few, I believe, would argue for that openly. The thesis is advanced rather by innuendo and insinuation.

Such suggestions lose all plausibility when we recall what this Communist movement has done to the nations and the peoples it has come to dominate. Let us think first in terms of nations.

Many of us knew at the United Nations Jan Masaryk, the son of the great author of Czechoslovak freedom. He was a Foreign Minister who believed, until almost the end, that the Communist movement in his country was something different; that it could be reconciled with the national freedom to which his father and he were so passionately dedicated. But in the end his broken corpse was offered to the world as mute evidence of the fact that international communism is never "different" and that there can be no genuine reconciliation between it and national freedom.

Czechoslovakia was stripped of every vestige of sovereignty, as we in the Americas understand that term. It was added to the list of victims, which already in Europe included Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, East Germany, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. These ten European nations, once proud and honorable examples

of national freedom, have become Soviet serfdoms or worse.

Within all the vast area, now embracing one-third of the world's people, where the military power of the Soviet Union is dominant, no official can be found who would dare to stand up and openly attack the Government of the Soviet Union. But in this hemisphere, it takes no courage for the representative of one of the smallest American countries openly to attack the government of the most powerful.

I rejoice that that kind of freedom exists in the Americas, even if it may be at times abused. But the essential is that there be a relationship of sovereign equality. We of the United States want to keep it that way. We seek no satellites, but only friendly equals. We never want to see at the pan-American table those who speak as the tools of non-American powers. We want to preserve and defend an American society, in which even the weak may speak boldly, because they represent national personalities which, as long as they are free, are equal.

It is the purpose of our resolution to assure that there will always be in this hemisphere such national personalities and dignity.

If now we turn to see what international communism has done to the individual human beings, we find that it has stripped them, too, of their sense of dignity and worth. The professional propagandists for communism talk glibly of lofty aims and high ideals. That is part of the routine—and fraudulent—appeal of the international Communist movement. It is one of the principal means by which the dissatisfied are led to follow false leaders. But once international communism has gained its end and subjected the people to the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat," then the welfare of the people ceases to be a matter of practical concern.

Communism and the Worker

Communism, in its initial theoretical stage, was designed primarily to serve the workers and to provide them, not with spiritual values, for communism is atheistic, but at least with a material well-being. It is worthwhile to observe what has actually happened to this favored group in countries subjugated by Communist power.

In these countries the workers have become virtual slaves, and millions of them are literally slaves. Instructive facts are to be found in the United Nations Report on Forced Labor, which was presented to the United Nations Assembly at its last session.¹ The authors of this report were three eminent and independent personalities from India, Norway, and Peru. The report finds that

the Soviet Union and its satellites use forced labor on a vast scale. Prior evidence presented to the United Nations indicates that approximately 15 million persons habitually fill the Soviet labor camps.

The Forced Labor Report calls the Soviet method of training and allocating manpower "A system of forced or compulsory labor." The Soviet workers are the most underpaid, overworked persons in any modern industrial state. They are the most managed, checked-on, spied-on, and unrepresented workers in the world today. There is no freedom of movement, for the Russian worker is not allowed to leave his job and shift to another job. He is bound to his job by his labor book. Except for the relative few who have class privileges, wages provide only a pitiful existence. Now, 37 years after the October revolution, unrest and discontent have so mounted in Soviet Russia that the rulers are forced publicly to notice them and to promise relief.

Conditions in the Soviet satellite countries are even worse than in Russia. The captive peoples have been subjected to sharply decreased living standards, since they lost their freedom, and to greater exploitation than prevails in Russia. The workers' outbreak in East Germany of last June showed in one revealing flash how desperate the people have become. Young boys armed only with stones dared to face up to Soviet tanks.

When I was in the East Sector of Berlin last month, the Soviet Foreign Minister referred to that outbreak, and he said that steps had been taken to be sure that it did not happen again. I saw those steps. They consisted of thousands upon thousands of heavily armed soldiers, with machineguns and tanks.

Traditions of liberty have been established in this hemisphere under the leadership of many great patriots. They fought for individual human rights and dignity. They lighted the guiding beacons along freedom's road, which have burned brightly in the healthy air of patriotic fervor. These beacons must not be stifled by the poisonous air of despotism now being fanned toward our shores from Moscow, Prague, and Budapest.

These places may seem far away. But let us not forget that in the early part of the last century the first danger to the liberties and independence which Bolívar, San Martín, and their heroic associates had won for the new Republics stemmed precisely from the despotic alliance forged by the Czar of Russia.

Sometimes, it seems, we recall that threat only in terms of colonialism. Actually, the threat that was deemed most grave was the desire of Czarist Russia and its allies to extend their despotic political system to this hemisphere.

I recall that President Monroe, in his message to Congress of December 2, 1823, addressed himself particularly to that phase of the problem. He

¹ U. N. doc. E/2431; for an excerpt, and for text of U. S. statement, see *BULLETIN* of Aug. 10, 1953, p. 167, and Dec. 21, 1953, p. 865.

spoke of ending future colonization by any European power, but he spoke with greater emphasis and at greater length of the danger which would come if "the Allied Powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent" of this hemisphere.

What he said was being said in similar terms by other great American patriots and defenders of human liberty. Those sentiments have long since ceased to be merely unilateral. They have become an accepted principle of this hemisphere. That is why, it seems to us, we would be false to our past unless we again proclaimed that the extension to this hemisphere of alien despotism would be a danger to us all, which we unitedly oppose.

The Price of Freedom

My Government is well aware of the fact that there are few problems more difficult, few tasks more odious, than that of effectively exposing and thwarting the danger of international communism.

As we have pointed out, that danger cloaks itself behind fine-sounding words; it uses the cover of many well-intentioned persons, and it so weaves itself into the fabric of community life that great courage and skill are required to sever the evil from the good. The slogan of "nonintervention" can plausibly be invoked and twisted to give immunity to what is, in fact, flagrant intervention.

The fact, however, that the defense of freedom is difficult, and calls for courage, is no adequate excuse for shutting our eyes to the fact that freedom is in fact endangered.

Freedom is never preserved for long except by vigilance and with dedicated effort. Those who do not have the will to defend liberty, soon lose it.

Danger to liberty constantly recurs in ever-changing form. To meet that danger requires flexibility and imagination. Each of our nations has in the past had to take some difficult and dangerous decisions, of one kind or another, on behalf of the independence and integrity of this hemisphere. During the 19th century, more than one American nation, including my own, risked the hazard of war against great military powers, rather than permit the intrusion into this hemisphere of the aggressive forces of European imperialism. During this 20th century, when evil forces of militarism and fascism twice sought world domination, the United States paid a great price in blood and treasure which served us all. Each of our American Republics has contributed to what has now become a glorious tradition.

Today we face a new peril that is in many respects greater than any of the perils of the past. It takes an unaccustomed form. It is backed by resources greater than have ever been accumulated under a single despotic will. However, we need not fear, because we too have greater assets. We have greater solidarity and greater trust born out of our past fraternal association. But just as the

danger assumes an unconventional form, so our response may also need to be different in its form.

We need not, however, solve all these matters here. What we do need to do is to identify the peril; to develop the will to meet it unitedly, if ever united action should be required; and meanwhile to give strong moral support to those governments which have the responsibility of exposing and eradicating within their borders the danger which is represented by alien intrigue and treachery.

Of course, words alone will not suffice. But words can be meaningful. They can help to forge a greater determination to assure our collective independence, so that each of our nations will, in whatever way that is truly its own, be the master of its destiny. Thus, we will have served our common cause against its enemies.

It is in that spirit and in that hope that the United States presents its resolution.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 11

Press release 130 dated March 12

The U.S. delegation has listened with close attention to the important observations which other delegations have made with reference to intervention of international communism in the American Republics.

I have been impressed by the spirit of solidarity and unity. One's faith in our inter-American association cannot but be strengthened by this experience. It is a new chapter in practical cooperation for a common purpose.

There has been, it seems to me, an extraordinary degree of unanimity as to basic objective and means. I am confident that this unity of view will be incorporated in the document we approve.

There appears to be general acceptance of two basic propositions, i. e., (1) that international communism, which our American Republics have twice denounced with unanimity, is still a danger to hemispheric integrity, and, (2) that it is important for us at this time solemnly to warn the authors of this threat to keep their hands off this hemisphere.

The U.S. proposal for giving effect to these two principles has been generally accepted. However, certain amendments have been proposed or suggested.

The United States has given very careful consideration to these amendments and I should like to express, at this time, my views concerning them.

The concern most often expressed is that our declaration might be interpreted as intervention, or justifying intervention, in the genuinely domestic affairs of an American State. This concern is, we believe, due to natural historical fears rather than to any language in the U.S. proposal.

As several of my colleagues have pointed out, in view of the specific purpose and scope of the pro-

posal and the safeguards of existing treaties within which it would operate, it is not conceivable that the declaration could be used for other than its intended purpose. I refer particularly to the admirable addresses of the Brazilian and Colombian Foreign Ministers. The U.S. proposal does not and obviously cannot enlarge or change in any way existing treaties.

The U. S. proposal, as submitted, is a foreign policy declaration directed against those in non-American lands who operate the subversive apparatus of international communism. They have used that apparatus to gain control over 800 million persons, to blot out independence in 15 nations in Europe and Asia, and they demonstrably are putting that apparatus into use against this hemisphere. We would warn them that we are aware of their design, that we oppose it, and that they cannot expect to gain a real success within this hemisphere because, if they should get control of any American State, we would all unite to deprive them of the fruits of their aggression and to restore the sovereignty and political independence to the American State that had been robbed of it.

Our proposed declaration in this sense is, I repeat, a foreign-policy declaration. Our admonitions are not addressed to any one of our Republics or to the Western Hemisphere.

Proposed U. S. Amendment

The delegations of Argentina and Mexico have suggested some verbal changes which they believe make this aspect of the declaration more clear. It seems to us, however, that the apprehension expressed comes not primarily from the present text but from historical fears and that the better and more adequate way to meet them is to add to the declaration as drafted by the United States an additional paragraph which would read as follows:

This declaration of foreign policy made by the American Republics in relation to dangers originating outside this Hemisphere is designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own form of government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.

Such a supplement to the declaration proposed by the United States will, we believe, dispose of all the fears which have been expressed. Certain proposals have been made by the Mexican delegation which are unacceptable to the United States because they would, in our opinion, basically alter the concept of the declaration and turn it from a foreign-policy declaration into a declaration of domestic import. These Mexican amendments fall under four headings:

1. They would, in general, substitute the words, "agents of foreign international communism," where the U.S. proposal speaks only of "international

communism." It is of course important that each of our states should take steps to detect and eradicate the secret agents which international communism has introduced into our midst. Such internal measures were recommended at the Fourth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, it was not the purpose of the United States to suggest that we should now merely repeat what was then said. We believe that we ought to give a simple, clear, and direct warning to the principals of these secret agents who for the most part reside in Moscow or satellite capitals and who from there dominate and direct the international Communist movement.

It is the fact that we direct our warning to them that gives the proposed declaration its status as a declaration of foreign policy. We would be reluctant to see our declaration altered so that it was essentially a doctrine of internal import as it would be if we directed ourselves only against the agents here of international communism.

2. It is suggested that we should introduce, at various points, references to our respective constitutional procedures. This would, of course, be appropriate if the declaration were designed to prescribe our own internal conduct. The United States would, however, be reluctant to adopt language which seemed to imply that that was the purpose of this declaration. Of course each of us will act in accordance with our constitutional processes. However, a warning to potential enemies to keep their hands off of us has nothing whatever to do with our own domestic constitutional procedures.

3. One of the Mexican amendments would basically alter what is the heart of the proposed declaration, namely, that part which says that

the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

In place of this clear, precise warning, which all can understand, the Mexican delegation would substitute a legalistic paragraph which attempts obscurely to define what we will do "when" the political institutions of any American State are subverted by the intervention of extra-continental or of any Communist power.

It seems to the United States unthinkable that the American States should adopt a declaration dealing with what we shall do "when" one of our American Republics is made the puppet of international communism. The whole purpose of our declaration is to prevent that from happening. A declaration which merely says what we shall do after it has happened would, I think, be wholly unacceptable to most of us. Certainly it is unacceptable to the United States.

The United States believes that, as suggested

by the Brazilian and Colombian delegations, the declaration contained in its draft could usefully be amended by inserting before the words "appropriate action" the words "for consultation and," so as to make it perfectly clear that meetings of consultation would precede action—as is indeed prescribed both by the Rio Pact and by the charter of the American States.

4. The Mexican delegation has proposed certain amendments to the second section of the U.S. draft which contains recommendations which relate primarily to exposures and exchanges of information. For reasons which were very ably expressed by the chairman of the Haitian delegation, the United States believes that the Mexican amendments in this respect are inadvisable.

References to Social and Economic Measures

A considerable amount of discussion has related to the possible inclusion in the proposed declaration of references to social and economic measures which it is believed would help our American Republics in their fight against international communism. In this connection an amendment has been proposed by the Mexican delegate and a suggestion made by the Panamanian delegation.

The U.S. delegation believes that this Conference should make clear in no uncertain terms the dedication of our Republics to human rights and freedoms and to healthy economic and social conditions. In a statement which I made yesterday before the Economic Committee, I pledged my Government to support economic proposals in this sense, and we will equally support an appropriate declaration dealing with human rights and with the inherent dignity of the individual without regard to race, nationality, religion, or class. We entertain grave doubt, however, as to the wisdom of including such a declaration in our message of warning to the Communist dictators. There are two reasons for our opinion that our declaration in these respects should be made elsewhere.

In the first place, it is, we believe, unfortunate to give the impression that we are interested in human rights, individual dignity, and opportunity and economic welfare only because we thereby combat communism. If there were no Communist threat in the world today, we would still believe that this Conference should renew its dedication to human welfare and its enhancement. It seems to us to degrade that which is most sacred and fundamental, to treat it as merely an anti-Communist tactic.

In the second place, it seems inappropriate to include a reference to our economic and social needs in a warning addressed to alien dictators. Surely we do not want to say to them in effect that their intervention would be acceptable in the case of an American State which did not achieve an ideal political, social, or economic order. The United States believes that the principle of non-

intervention is an absolute principle and that we should avoid anything which could be interpreted to indicate that we would compromise it under any conditions.

For both reasons the United States believes that the declarations of our dedication to, and concern for, social and economic welfare should be expressed in another resolution rather than in a declaration of foreign policy directed to the alien despots who plot against us.

Mr. Chairman and Fellow Delegates, there are one or two around this table who seem to have expressed the thought that our collective American system is incapable of dealing with the kind of threat which now faces us and the formidable character of which has been demonstrated in respect to many countries and many people.

It is said that we cannot show a collective front against this danger because we cannot trust ourselves. It is suggested that the doctrine of non-intervention is so lightly regarded by the American States themselves that two-thirds of them might unite to practice intervention against a fellow American State. This danger is said to be so much greater than the danger of Communist intervention, that the American States should leave themselves exposed to international communism rather than run the risk that the doctrine of collective security might be turned by American States themselves into a doctrine of collective intervention.

Mr. Chairman, I have greater faith than that in the American system. I believe that there is not a single American State which would practice intervention against another American State. It is incredible to me that it should even be suggested that 14 of our 21 American States could be found to abuse the charter of the American States and the Rio Pact and to pervert those great enlightened political instruments into instruments of evil.

I can think of nothing more disastrous than for such mutual distrust to be exhibited to all the world so that our enemies may seek to take advantage from it.

I believe that the great disasters come about largely through miscalculation. Aggressors assume that they can with little risk make great gains. The purpose of the declaration proposed by the United States is to give a warning which will prevent such miscalculation. We believe that if the American Republics clearly and unitedly warn the alien plotters to keep away, the effect of that warning will be greatly to diminish the danger.

We believe, on the other hand, that if we fail to utter that clear and united warning, if we show distrust among ourselves, then the danger will go on mounting, and presently our beloved America will be ravaged by those evil forces which have turned Europe and Asia into continents of strife and misery.

This hemisphere has had an almost miraculously safe existence. It has been won by the courage, the foresight, of great patriots. Today it is our responsibility to preserve for future generations

the great and sacred heritage which those patriots entrusted to our hands. May we play our part so that we too shall be honored by those who come after us.

Pan-American Economic Relations

Following are texts of statements made on March 10 by Secretary Dulles and by Samuel C. Waugh, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, before the Committee on Economic Matters of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas:

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 128 dated March 10

I have sought the privilege of sitting with this economic committee because the problems which we face here in the Americas are as much economic as they are political.

It is sometimes said that we must seek economic welfare for the reason that that is the best defense against communism. I, myself, would put it differently. We seek economic welfare because, here in the Americas, we believe that all human beings, without regard to race, religion, or class should have the opportunity to develop in body, mind, and spirit. That can happen only in a healthy society. Therefore, we seek it as something which is good in itself, not merely as a defensive mechanism against communism.

Different nations develop their economies in different ways. That is natural and as it should be. We do not believe in a world of conformity. We believe that there is a richness in diversity. Just as this universe in which we live was created as a universe of diversity, so the human institutions which man builds are properly diverse, to take account of human and geographical differences.

In the United States we have a political system and an economic system which we believe to be good. At least, we are convinced that they serve well our particular needs.

We do not claim that our economy is perfect. In the past, business cycles, sometimes of great severity, have brought misery upon many people at home and abroad for reasons which they themselves could not control. There have been segments of our people who have not received

adequate opportunity and who have not been rewarded in accordance with their merits.

We are constantly striving to make our society better by applying the lessons of experience. We do not believe that there exists, any more, the risk of great depressions as part of an inevitable cycle. Also the abundant productivity of our economy is steadily being spread to benefit more and more people.

All this is being done within the framework of a free enterprise economy which places a primary responsibility upon private effort. In this way we seek to develop a population of individuals who work hard, who invent, who save, who share. We recognize that, as social and economic problems grow in magnitude and complexity, so government has to assume increasing supervisory tasks. Nevertheless, the United States continues to place its primary dependence upon individual effort and upon private capital.

Our society is by no means a self-contained society. We know that for our present well-being, and the increasing of that well-being with others, foreign trade plays an important part in our economy. We know that it plays an even more important part in the economy of many friendly nations. We shall, therefore, strive to give to trade the dependability which it deserves.

Many of you feel that some adjustments of United States economic policies would be mutually beneficial. You may be right. Certainly, these are matters which we are prepared to consider openmindedly. That, indeed, is one of the reasons why we have come here with an important economic and financial delegation, representing not only the Department of State but also the Treasury, Commerce, and the Export-Import Bank. We are here to discuss, to study, and to learn, in line with the traditional United States policy of constantly taking new ways whenever we can be confident that the change is for the better.

We recognize that, in the economic field, it is more difficult to combine unity with diversity than it is in the political field.

In many of the American Republics, government plays a much more important role in economic affairs than we think desirable for ourselves. Some of you may think in terms of governmental capabilities, where we think in terms of private activity. Action which some of your governments would undertake as a normal function might seem to us a major departure from our standards of peacetime activity. Equally, opportunities and safeguards for private activity which we treat as a matter of course may seem to some of you to be extraordinary.

No one of our Republics should expect another to abandon its economic creed, in which its people believe and which seems adapted to its particular environment. Nevertheless, we must find more and better ways to cooperate. Happily, there are vast areas within which there are no basic obstacles, as evidenced by the very large amount of business which we do with each other. There is, and will continue to be, a vast exchange of goods between our countries to our mutual advantage. There will, I hope, be a substantial flow of capital which will help develop the vast potential resources of many of our southern neighbors.

But what now is, is not good enough to be accepted as satisfactory. We must do better. We must eradicate some of the difficulties and obstacles for which none of us can properly be held exclusively responsible.

We have heard here at this Conference a number of economic complaints directed against the United States. I take no offense at that. This is the place where we should talk frankly as friends, and it is best that we should say what is on our minds. However, I ask you to believe that these matters are not as simple as they sometimes sound. The difficulties may seem relatively small, but they can establish precedents which would have vast scope and consequences.

The situation requires that we should not be self-righteous, either in defense or attack, but that we should go forward with good will, tolerance, and patience to find an understanding. When I mention patience, I am not referring to delay but to effort which in order to be successful must be careful and painstaking.

The United States is eager to see within this hemisphere people who everywhere share the health of a good economy in the form appropriate to their own society and their own ideals; who have the opportunity to engage usefully in congenial work of their own choosing; and to enjoy, with their families and their neighbors, in peace and tranquillity, the fruits of their labor.

The United States will not continue to be satisfied merely with good political relations in this hemisphere. We also want good economic relations. We shall seek them on a basis of mutual respect for the economic and social, as well as the political, beliefs of each other. That is the pledge I give you.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY WAUGH

Press release 127 dated March 10

The members of the United States delegation who arrived 10 days ago have reported with enthusiasm the cordial reception they have received in this beautiful capital of our host country. Since arriving a few days ago, I have caught this same spirit.

We all look forward during the Conference to renewing old friendships as well as making new friends. It is our most sincere hope that, working jointly with you, we will be able to make some worthwhile contributions toward solving some of our mutual problems.

In his opening address last week,¹ Secretary Dulles mentioned the report of the Randall Commission with which you are all familiar. In the very near future—possibly while we are still here—our President will send to the Congress a message outlining his recommendations for a foreign economic policy in the light of that report. The Secretary also discussed the flow of capital and technical assistance, our position on the coffee situation, and the action our President has just taken on the wool tariff. I might add that on Monday our Government announced a reduction in countervailing duties on wool tops from 18 to 6 percent.² I am also pleased to refer to the heartening news of the progress made in several recommendations in the Eisenhower report.

The Secretary clarified certain questions about the future lending policy of the Export-Import Bank and mentioned the importance we place on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The statements which have been made in this Commission have been presented in a spirit of frankness and good will. This spirit we wish to reciprocate. Great care has gone into the preparation of your statements, and they deserve the serious consideration of all. In the committee meetings to follow, our delegates will sit down with you and discuss these and other important economic subjects in more detail.

The economic development of the entire hemisphere is of major interest to the United States. We are all partners in seeking common economic goals. These common purposes were perhaps most simply and clearly expressed in the economic charter of the Americas: "To live decently and work and exchange productively in peace and security." The economic growth of each of us strengthens and broadens the basis for stable democratic societies of free men. One of the best assurances of a workable inter-American system is the continued success of our efforts toward greater economic development.

The basic philosophy of the United States emphasizes individual freedom. Our economic be-

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 379.

² See Treasury Department press release of Mar 8.

liefs rest on confidence in what President Eisenhower recently called "the expansive power of individual enterprise." This is the revolutionary idea which, recognized or not, was so important in releasing human energies from the restraints of feudalism. The expansive power of individual enterprise again played a dramatic role when hemispheric trade came to flourish with the breaking of the bonds of colonialism. We reaffirm our faith in this constructive and expansive force.

The reaffirmation of these beliefs has led us to reexamine the proper role of government in modern society. Many of you have read the words of our President in his Economic Report to the Congress.³

May I quote from one section:

The Government can greatly help to maintain prosperity. But it is well to recall the accumulated experience of generations which has taught us that no Government can of itself create real and lasting prosperity. A thriving economy depends fundamentally on the enterprise of millions of individuals, acting in their own interests and in the interests of their families and communities.

The President then went on to say:

The best service that the Government can render our economy, besides helping to maintain stability and insuring a floor of protection for the population, is therefore to create an environment in which men are eager to make new jobs, to acquire new tools of production, to improve or scrap the old ones, design new products and develop new markets, increase efficiency all around, and thus be able and willing to pay higher wages and provide better working conditions. The Federal Government is fostering and will continue to foster this kind of environment.

We believe that the role of government in the economy is to nurture and promote individual effort and not to replace it. In carrying this principle into action, the United States Government is pledged to maintain fair and equitable conditions under which our business enterprises, large and small, and our workers can operate most efficiently.

The dignity and worth of each individual in our society is one of our most sacred values. My Government shares with the Governments of the other American countries the objective of making these values a living reality.

In your statements you have indicated an interest in the economic situation and outlook in the United States.

U. S. Economic Conditions

Our economy in 1953 achieved a gross national product of \$367 billion—the highest on record, and 5 percent larger than in 1952. Civilian employment averaged 61.9 million for the year. Unemployment, although increasing at the end of the year, averaged 1½ million, the lowest of all postwar years. Thus the economy had some

of the characteristics of a business boom. As we move into 1954, production is down about 10 percent from its highest point and there is some increase in unemployment, though not beyond a figure which in times past was considered normal. What we have been experiencing is a transition from a wartime economy to one more nearly adjusted to peace. We appear to be making that adjustment without disturbance.

Farm production in 1953 was high but prices fell for the second successive year. Lower agricultural exports added to our domestic farm problem.

In foreign trade, United States exports of non-military goods to all countries in 1953 were \$12.2 billion, about \$1 billion less than in 1952. At the same time that our exports declined, our total imports rose slightly to \$10.9 billion in 1953. Our exports to Latin America were about 15 percent less than in 1952, amounting to \$3.1 billion, while our imports were \$3.4 billion, about the same as in the previous year. Latin America thus continued to provide about one-third of our total imports, exceeding those from any other area in the world.

Our banking system, our insurance companies, and other financial institutions have operated conservatively and are in a strong position. The general price level has been stable. Plans of United States private business for new investment in plant and equipment, and projects of States and municipalities, indicate continued heavy expenditures for new capital investment.

These and other factors provide the basis for confidence in the economic outlook.

Your interest in the growth and stability of our country is equaled by our abiding interest in economic conditions in your countries. We fully recognize the problems facing various countries as their delegates have described them in these meetings. We are profoundly impressed, however, by the great progress which country after country has made toward the solution of these problems, each working with its problems in its own way.

Output in Latin America in the postwar period has increased by almost 5 percent annually. This is nothing short of spectacular. It exceeds the recent rate of growth in the United States. These gains have been based largely on the utilization of domestic resources. Your own people provided most of the capital, and their enterprise put the capital to work.

Foreign capital can hasten the development process. It will be attracted by conditions that promise fair treatment, stability, and a return which is interesting in relation to the returns elsewhere.

Tax and Treaty Matters

To provide incentives for an increased flow of private capital abroad, President Eisenhower has

³ H. Doc. 289, 83d Cong., 2d sess. For excerpts, see BULLETIN of Feb. 15, 1954, p. 219.

proposed specific changes in the United States tax laws. Among these are proposals (1) to tax income from foreign subsidiaries, or foreign branches that operate and elect to be taxed as subsidiaries, at a rate 14 percentage points lower than the regular corporation rates and (2) to broaden the definition of foreign taxes which may be credited against the United States income tax. We feel that these recommendations, if enacted into law, will represent positive unilateral action by the United States Government to encourage foreign investment.

Bilaterally, there are further steps the United States is prepared to take. I refer to treaties for the alleviation of double taxation. These treaties are an integral part of the United States program to create a favorable tax climate for international trade and business. As of today, the United States is a party with foreign countries to 15 treaties relating to income taxes. Unfortunately, we have no treaty with any Latin American Republic. We trust that, in furtherance of their expressed desire for foreign private capital, the Latin American Republics will be receptive to our offer to meet and attempt to work out mutually equitable arrangements to clarify international tax relations and minimize double taxation.

The United States also continues to be interested in negotiating with other governments more general treaties which will define the terms under which private capital may enter and operate in foreign countries. Discussion on a bilateral basis looking toward the establishment of common rules for the treatment of foreign investments would be mutually advantageous.

We are ready to discuss these treaty matters in the appropriate committee.

You have made clear at this Conference your concern about the relative prices of primary products and manufactured goods in international trade and the instability of raw material prices. We agree on the importance of these problems. They are, however, highly technical subjects which are difficult to treat adequately in this statement. I feel these are matters for fuller discussion in the appropriate committee.

In the field of primary production we have problems in my own country. The United States has always been a major producer and exporter of agricultural products. Today we are confronted with large surpluses arising in part from the great efforts to relieve shortages of farm products resulting from the devastation and destruction of World War II. It is worth noting that one of the primary causes of these surpluses has been our attempt to maintain too rigid a relationship between the prices of farm products and other prices. One result has been to price our agricultural products out of many foreign markets.

It takes time to adjust our agricultural economy to the more normal demand which has now developed. Legislation has been recommended to

the Congress which, it is hoped, will hasten these adjustments. In the meantime, my Government is keeping its international responsibilities very much in mind in dealing with this problem. It is taking precautions to prevent, so far as possible, the disposal of our surpluses from interfering with normal marketings of friendly countries.

Our interest in the economic subjects under discussion at this Tenth Inter-American Conference is reflected in the fact that, in addition to the representatives of the Department of State, my Government is also represented by W. Randolph Burgess, Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury; Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce; our representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, your longtime friend, Ambassador Merwin L. Bohan; Maj. Gen. Glenn E. Edgerton, Managing Director of the Export-Import Bank, together with members of their staffs. These gentlemen are here to participate in our committee discussions.

Many of our problems are not susceptible of easy or once-and-for-all solutions. This much can be said with assurance: Not only during this Conference but in the months and years to come there will be continuing and friendly consultations among us. We will constantly seek to develop with you constructive economic policies based on the mutuality of our interests.

It is for these reasons that we welcome and support the suggestion made here for a special Economic Conference. Possibly the extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, planned for this year, would serve this purpose.

In friendship and with a feeling of common destiny, we shall strive to work out with you constructive solutions to our common problems.

Secretary Dulles Returns From Caracas Conference

Press release 133 dated March 14

Following is the text of a statement made by Secretary Dulles on March 14 on his return from the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, Venezuela:

I am very satisfied with the results so far obtained at the Inter-American Conference at Caracas. Yesterday, the [Politico-Juridical] Committee, with only the negative vote of Guatemala, made a momentous declaration of principle. In effect, it makes as the international policy of this hemisphere a portion of the Monroe Doctrine which has largely been forgotten and which relates to the extension to this hemisphere of the political system of despotic European powers.

Useful discussions have been going on with reference to economic and commercial matters,

and a better understanding will, I am confident, come out of the Conference.

We have had good results so far primarily because we were advocating a cause which was good, namely, the integrity and political and economic well-being of this hemisphere. Also, we have had a very fine delegation, and I want to pay tribute to the help that was rendered by Senator Hickenlooper, who returns with me, and Senator Green, who is returning on Monday. These two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have dealt particularly with Latin American affairs, and their advice to me was of the utmost

value. Also, Ambassador Lodge, who returns with me, was able to make a significant contribution. His work with the United Nations gave him an intimate acquaintanceship with Latin American problems and with the leading personalities of Latin America.

The new Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. Holland, was sworn into his job in Caracas and is now carrying on as my deputy.

Many important problems remain to be dealt with, and I am particularly anxious that better understandings be reached in relation to economic and social matters of common concern.

America, Japan, and the Future of the Pacific

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

One hurdle I am sure will not be a problem this evening. I do not have to convince this group that the United States is involved in the future of the Pacific.

That the United States is a Pacific power is a fact just beginning to dawn upon some parts of this country. There are a few perhaps in other regions of our country who still have to be convinced.

The truth is that today the interests of the United States are worldwide. It is dangerous to think exclusively in terms of either the Atlantic or the Pacific. It is equally dangerous to neglect either. The future of both concerns the United States intimately.

The threat to both is the same. The ambitions of Soviet imperialism are universal. Its goal has always been world domination.

In the Pacific the Communists have three current objectives. They are (1) the manpower of China; (2) the industrial capacity of Japan; and (3) the resources of Southeast Asia. The first objective has been attained. The 450 millions of China today are laboring under the yoke. How long that situation will last may be a \$64 question—but today it is a fact. It is of course an unhappy fact for the free world as well as the

Chinese themselves. Communist control of the Chinese mainland has meant the death, we are told, to date, of 15 million Chinese, either through starvation or liquidation. To the Communists that was not a tragedy. Manpower, as they see it, is expendable.

Moscow Communists found Chinese manpower useful in Korea. They wanted Korea as a take-off for Japan. They were quite willing to die to the tune of a million or so North Korean and Chinese Communists to attain that objective. The Chinese Communist leaders cooperated. To them what were a million lives? "The innumerable black-haired people who grow rice," as someone once described the Chinese peasants.

While the Communist objective in Japan is also manpower, there emphasis is rather on the industrial skills of the people and Japan's productive plant.

Japan was the first of the Asian nations to industrialize. Today, 9 years after a war that devastated large areas, she is again producing. Production is now 50 percent more than it was in 1940. Her industrial capacity is estimated at 50 percent of that of the Soviet Union—this for a nation without material resources of its own, with 87 million people crowded into an area of only 147,690 square miles, considerably less than that of California.

We are proud that Japan has made an amazing recovery with American cooperation and support. It was in this city that the peace treaty with Japan

¹ Address made before the World Affairs Council of Northern California and the American Legion of San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif., on Mar. 8 (press release 122 dated Mar. 9).

was signed in 1951. At that time Earl Warren, then Governor of California, said:

It has been my privilege during the past few weeks to visit Japan and I have returned convinced that, given the opportunity and sympathetic assistance, Japan is in a position to contribute mightily to the type of leadership which the cause of peace now needs so desperately.

Your Mayor, the Honorable Elmer E. Robinson, reminding the world that San Francisco had cradled the United Nations in its beginning, spoke of the work then "so nobly begun." "You are," he told the delegates, "met to advance that work . . . to expand the area of peace and to restore Japan to the community of sovereign nations dedicated to the common good of all mankind."

Basis of U. S. Policy

United States policy in Japan is based on the conviction that the Japanese "restored to the community of sovereign nations" can indeed advance the cause of peace in Asia. Today there is representative government in Japan. That government is composed of men with faith in ideals dedicated to the welfare of the people and to securing for their country a place of dignity and honor in the free world and a voice in the affairs of men.

Japanese skills in the arts of the 20th century can serve as a model for all Asia. The products of those skills are needed by her fellow Asians, but even more she can be of value as an exporter of the industrial revolution, of its science, its technology, its skills, its know-how—to use a much overworked term.

The Communists, of course, see Japan in their usual perverted light. They, too, would use her, but for their own selfish purposes. To serve those purposes they are exerting every effort to turn her against the United States and the free world.

Communist propaganda in Japan follows the usual pattern. They play upon reviving nationalism. They have launched a campaign of misrepresentation and hate of the United States of America. They exploit Japan's ancient and traditional distrust of foreigners. They attack and try to discredit pro-U. S. A. statesmen.

Outside of Japan, the Communists foster anti-Japanese feeling left over from the war. They are very busy in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and elsewhere where memory of the Japanese occupation is still fresh.

In the United States itself they have not been idle. We are reminded of Pearl Harbor, of Bataan, of Japanese abuse of war prisoners. Wherever there is a bitter memory—and there are many—the Communists work to keep old wounds smarting, old hatreds alive.

And truly, to quote again Chief Justice Warren, "Never before in history have victors been so magnanimous with the vanquished—never before in history have the conquered been so encouraged to regain their normal status of dignity and self-esteem."

In Europe it is often said that the Americans could forgive because they had not, personally, suffered so deeply. Whatever may be said about that in Asia is certainly not true. We do, indeed, have much to forgive. That we have forgiven will, I am confident, stand forever to our credit.

Our hopes for Japan are based fundamentally on our belief and faith in human beings. It is part and parcel of our basic philosophy. It isn't a question of benevolence. It is rather a matter of faith. In the occupation we worked, to be sure, with the Japanese leaders. But we reached beyond them to the people. Our aim was to give the individual Japanese—men and women, farmer and industrial worker, artisan and professional man—a stake in freedom.

We believe we have done that. And our foreign policy toward Japan is based on that belief.

There is, of course, so much yet to be done. The Japanese economy should be made independent. It is today dependent, in large part, upon the United States. We have, in fact, since the end of hostilities invested billions of dollars in Japanese recovery, but our Japanese friends want to be independent and to see their country stand on its own feet.

To a country lacking in natural resources the answer is trade. Japan's industrial output must fill the gap.

Trade with Communist China is not exclusively the answer. Today Japan's controls on trade with China are more stringent than those of some other major trading countries. The United States and Canada of course have complete embargoes. But even in 1934-1935 when there were no restrictions, trade with China was only 10 percent of the total exports. Consequently, a relaxation of present controls would hardly solve Japan's economic problems.

Japan needs dollars so that she may buy in the United States. She wants to earn these dollars. She can do so only by selling her goods to us.

I am not unaware of the problems involved in this question. But the answer does not lie in shutting our doors to Japanese goods. Perhaps no decision the United States makes in 1954 will be more crucial than those we make with respect to imports. To Japan, they will be all-important.

Japan would like to trade with Southeast Asia, the source of many of her raw materials. It is to the interest of the United States to encourage that trade although it may put Japanese producers in competition with those of the United States as well as with other nations of the free world.

It is my conviction, however, that the area offers room for all of us. The Far East, as a whole, contains about a third of the world's population. That is nearly a billion people. Their needs are great. No one country alone could hope to fill them. By all means let them open their doors to Japan. It means economic health for that country and added security to the free world.

The resources of Southeast Asia, as I have said, are the third objective of the Communists in Asia. And just as they saw Korea as the gateway to Japan, they see Indochina as the gateway to the southeast.

Stopping the Communists in Indochina has been the responsibility of France and the Vietnamese. It has been a costly operation for both. Our aid has been supplemental. We are not a belligerent and we do not call the shots.

Capitalizing on Nationalism

In Indochina, as elsewhere in Asia, the Communists have tried to identify themselves with the nationalist movement. It has been, in Viet-Nam, their strongest weapon. The truth is, of course, that Ho Chi-Minh is a 100 percent Marxist. The independence he promises would be a mockery. His victory would add Indochina to the unhappy list of Communist satellites.

Actually the Vietnamese Government, like the Governments of the other two Associated States, Cambodia and Laos, has been moving steadily toward independence. Increasingly the nationalist regimes of the three states have been challenging the false claims of the Communists. As they grow in political stature a new spirit will pervade the area, backed by the national armies now developing under the competent leadership of General Navarre, Commander of the French Union Forces.

In Indochina, as elsewhere in Asia, our objective is the creation of strength on the side of the nationalist forces and real freedom for the people. We are contributing, when such aid is requested, toward that strength. We have had a military mission in Indochina since 1950 and have contributed substantially to the military programs.

Elsewhere in the area we are also aiding anti-Communist forces. We have agreed to aid Pakistan in the buildup of its military force. Similar aid has been offered India.

As you know, since 1951 we have had treaties of mutual defense with Australia and New Zealand. A similar treaty with the Philippines was signed in August of 1951. A third, with Japan, was agreed upon in September 1951. We have one in Korea.

Secretary Dulles, in his speech to the Nation on February 24,² reported on the United States position and accomplishments at the Four-Power Conference which had just concluded in Berlin. In discussing the agreement in Berlin to hold a subsequent meeting at Geneva to which a number of other participants, including Communist China, would be invited, he made clear what the position of Communist China would be, saying:

Under [the Berlin] resolution the Communist regime will not come to Geneva to be honored by us, but rather to account before the bar of world opinion.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 8, 1954, p. 343.

The conference at Geneva is, in fact, the Korean Political Conference which we had been trying to get at Panmunjom. We already had been talking to the Chinese Communists at Panmunjom as the malevolent force that had brutally attacked an outpost of the free world. That is the only role in which they will appear at Geneva. They cannot inflate it with the wind of their propaganda.

Moreover, the Soviet Union appears as no neutral. Its role in organizing, directing, and supplying the aggression against the Republic of Korea is too well known. At Geneva the Soviet Union, their North Korean creation, and Communist China—the forces responsible for the aggression in Korea—will be represented on one side; on the other side will be those who halted the aggression—the Republic of Korea and the nations who contributed forces to the United Nations Command.

Thus, at Geneva the free world side will be calling the Communist side to account and demanding that they make clear their future intentions. The Soviet Union and Communist China both were involved from beginning to end of the war in Korea.

It also was agreed at Berlin that the problem of restoring peace in Indochina would be discussed in the conference at Geneva. Here again it is the Communists who are being called to account before the bar of world opinion. The Communist Viet Minh regime is fully attached to the world Communist movement under Moscow's direction. The reality of this situation makes it obvious that the discussions on both Korea and Indochina at Geneva will be essentially a conference between the side of Communist aggression and the side of freedom.

Anti-Communist states of Asia are themselves considering a mutual defense pact. We would encourage such action by the Pacific community and would cooperate with such an association.

Scope of Technical Assistance Programs

The military aid we are giving our friends of Asia and the Middle East is a necessity. However, as a nation we have never put our sole confidence in "reeking tube and iron shard." Our programs of technical assistance are carrying to nation after nation the skills and experience developed over the centuries on our own soil. United States technicians are now in 38 underdeveloped countries demonstrating American good will and assisting the peoples of these countries in economic and social progress.

For example: Sixteen United States technicians have cooperated with the Government of Indonesia in a program which has given 2 million people protection against malaria.

In Iran, United States technicians have been working with the Iranian Ministry of Health, the United Nations World Health Organization, and the University of Tehran in a malaria control

program which has sprayed 12,659 villages to the benefit of more than 4 million people. The program has reduced the disease in some areas from around 90 percent to 20 percent and to 10 percent in others.

In another program in Iran a cooperative United States-Iranian farm project has carried modern agricultural methods to 20,711 farmers in 800 villages. Two hundred and fifty-five Iranian extension agents are being trained.

A rice production program in Borneo is rehabilitating 370,650 acres of old rice fields. Rice production in Bastar, India, has been increased from 400 to 1,200 pounds per acre through the work of Indian and United States farm experts. Working in cooperation with the Government of India, 33 United States technicians are helping train Indian village workers.

United States technicians have advised and assisted the Government of Jordan in the first census taken in the area since Bible times. We are helping the Government of Saudi Arabia to revamp its monetary system. We are advising on water development projects in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, India, and Pakistan.

The United States, through the Foreign Operations Administration, is providing technicians to the Afghan Government in the Helmand Valley Development Project. The project involves an area of nearly a million acres. Eventually it will provide permanent homes and a livelihood for a large number of Afghanistan's nomadic population.

The technical assistance programs are building a genuine partnership between underdeveloped nations and the United States from which both will benefit. We do not place our reliance solely on arms and armaments. The United States has peculiar qualifications which not only permit but compel us to take leadership in the field of technical assistance. We were ourselves once a colonial power winning our independence by revolution. We have no territorial ambitions. We alone of the major countries of the free world combine recent experience in self-development as an underdeveloped country with experience in the use of modern techniques of production and distribution, education and health, to say nothing of our interest in the culture of other peoples.

We Americans know that the billion and more peoples of the Far East are the largest potential reservoir of consumer needs in the world. As they become more prosperous they will need more and more consumer goods. To a country committed to expanding production that is an opportunity we wish to develop.

For us, helping them realize their potential is an opportunity and an obligation. Certainly the blessings we as a nation have enjoyed entail certain responsibilities—moral responsibilities.

That we will benefit materially from the fair discharge of those responsibilities is beside the

point. Personally I would consider our technical assistance programs justified in any case. That we will also profit otherwise is serendipity, to use the word coined by Walpole. To translate Walpole—serendipity means unexpected benefits picked up when in search of something entirely different.

The major present threat to the realization of our objectives is the imperialist ambition of Russia. That ambition is not new. It was old when Ivan the Terrible reigned. That the heart of the struggle would be Asia was long ago anticipated.

A hundred years ago, Commodore Perry predicted that the struggle between Russia and the West would be decided in Asia. He urged then fortification of the very islands of the Pacific that we fortified in World War II and which we now hold. Today the United States and Asia face the danger of which Perry warned us.

While we have been slow to heed the Commodore's warning, now we certainly recognize the accuracy of his forecast. In the Pacific we are dealing with a region as vital to us as it is vital to the free world. If the issue, as Perry predicted, is to be joined there, we must take every step to make certain that it is resolved in our favor.

Belgian Action on EDC

Press release 131 dated March 13

Secretary Dulles on March 12 sent the following message to Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland through Ambassador Frederick M. Alger at Brussels:

I am very happy to learn of the action of the Belgian Senate in ratifying the treaty establishing the European Defense Community. This action, following the vote of the Chamber last November 26, completes Belgian parliamentary action on this important matter and is another manifestation of the positive role your Nation has exercised in the political, economic, and military integration of Europe. Your personal devotion and that of your colleagues in the Belgian Government to the cause of assuring permanent peace and security for the free world has again been demonstrated.

EDC Protocol to North Atlantic Treaty

Press release 120 dated March 8

The following remarks were made by Acting Secretary Smith upon the deposit by Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands, of the Netherlands instrument of ratification of the EDC protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty:

Mr. Ambassador, it gives me very great pleasure to accept as the representative of the depositary

government the Netherlands instrument of ratification of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. By this Protocol the guaranties of the North Atlantic Treaty are extended to the members of the European Defense Community.¹

The Netherlands, which on February 25, 1954, became the first country to deposit its instrument of ratification of the EDC, now also becomes the

first EDC country to deposit ratification of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Netherlands Government can be justifiably proud of the initiative and leadership that they have demonstrated in working toward the achievement of a European Defense Community.

And I am proud that your Government has taken this action and I congratulate you.

The Foundations of American Attitudes

by *H. Freeman Matthews*

*Ambassador to the Netherlands*²

It is a great privilege for me to be with you tonight and to have the opportunity of telling you some of my thoughts about American foreign policy. There is one particular aspect of that policy upon which I should like to concentrate. It is a very important aspect and one which I believe deserves more attention than is usually given to it. That is the attitude of the United States toward its friends and allies.

Last December, our Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, replying to some American critics of American foreign policy, made the following statement:

It is the clear and firm purpose of this Administration to treat other free nations as sovereign equals, whether they be large or small, strong or weak. . . .

Today it is to our interest to assist certain countries. But that does not give us the right to try to take them over, to dictate their trade policies, and to make them our satellites.

Indeed, we do not want weak or subservient allies. Our friends and allies are dependable just because they are unwilling to be anyone's satellites. They will freely sacrifice much in a common effort. But they will be no more subservient to the United States than they will be subservient to Soviet Russia.

Let us be thankful that they are that way and that there still survives so much rugged determination to be free. If that were not so, we would be isolated in the world and in mortal peril.³

Mr. Dulles clearly and vigorously expressed in these sentences a cardinal tenet of American foreign policy. The United States seeks no other course, will pursue no other course, than that of

friendly and understanding cooperation in its relations with other free nations.

It is true that only recently in our history has the necessity for international cooperation appeared to us to be really essential. Only recently have the American people become so aware of what I shall call the "global" responsibilities of the United States.

In the early history of my country during our struggle for freedom there was a watchword: "United we stand, divided we fall." The American people, having witnessed the turbulent and tragic history of our century, recognize that this 18th century cry has equal validity in the present troubled state of the world. As a consequence, wholehearted cooperation with other free nations has become a cornerstone of American foreign policy, a principle supported by both political parties in the United States, Republican and Democratic. As President Eisenhower has said: ". . . unity among free nations is our only hope for survival in the face of the worldwide Soviet conspiracy backed by the weight of Soviet military power. This struggle dominates all other considerations of our times. The issue, freedom versus communism, is a life and death matter. To my mind it is the struggle of the ages."³ So spoke our President.

You will say, and rightly, that Americans have not always shown their belief in the interrelationship and interdependence of nations. Our critics make much of historical isolationism in the United States. But this isolationism accorded with the needs of the time and our capacities in the first century of our independent existence. The Thirteen Colonies which joined to form the United States were weak and, in those days, far removed from the centers of world power. They were

¹ For text of the Protocol, which was signed at Paris on May 27, 1952, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 896.

² Address made before the Netherlands Association for International Affairs at The Hague, Netherlands, on Feb. 24.

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811.

struggling to establish the basis of our Union, and that struggle with its intercolony rivalries, jealousies and purely local tenacity to retain cherished prerogatives had much in common with your own history of the stirring time of William the Silent. The energies of our new Nation were devoted to consolidating the principles which brought it into being. Throughout the 19th century the young Republic was occupied with the opening of a vast continent, expansion westward, development of natural resources and adjustment to the many changes of our industrial era. But during this period it would be unjust to say we abdicated our responsibilities as a member of the international community or that we sheltered behind a Chinese wall of isolation. We did not keep traders from across the seas confined to a tiny mud island as happened to that hardy handful of merchants from your country in their patient, successful siege to keep open commerce with Japan for over 200 years, from 1641 to 1858. Indeed we drew from Europe in those years thousands who aided and shared in our growth as a nation.

Growth and Responsibility

During the First World War the United States had become sufficiently strong, sufficiently sure of itself, to share the responsibilities of membership in a rapidly changing world order. Obviously, however, a change in the thinking of a democratic nation cannot be accomplished overnight. After that war, carried along by the nostalgic upsurge of the popular demand "to return to normalcy"—as the slogan went—opponents of the League of Nations were able to prevent our membership in it. But realization and recognition of our multilateral interests gradually dawned on our consciousness during the next decade. When the Nazis began their tragic and devastating onslaught the American people had no doubt where its interests lay or of the direction its Government must take. The human desire to avoid involvement in a bloody and distant struggle slowly gave way to the knowledge that all that we cherished was at stake, and Pearl Harbor crystallized our united stand to make war till victory was complete. The history of that period and of our efforts jointly with our Allies to establish that great institution, the United Nations, is familiar to you all.

Basic to an understanding of why we believe that mutual respect and confidence between nations is so vital, is an understanding of the American character. A vivid description of an American was written in 1782 by that keen observer of American life, Hector St. John Crèvecoeur. Let me read it:

What then is the American, this new man? He is either an European, or the descendant of an European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you find in no other country. . . . I could point out to you a family whose grandfather was an Englishman, whose wife

was Dutch, whose son married a French woman and whose present four sons have now four wives of different nations. *He is an American, who, leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds.* . . .

Thus, by reason of our diverse origins, as early as 1782 a distinctive American character was being formed. It is well to recall in this connection the prominent part that religion and things of the spirit have played in the formation of our national character and our Nation. With few exceptions the original Thirteen Colonies were founded by individuals seeking freedom of worship. To my knowledge no other country has had such a basic spiritual compulsion for its foundation. To this religious influence was added the stirring precepts of 18th century enlightenment—the concept of the free individual, the inherent dignity of man—as a basis for our society and government. These two influences are as fundamental to the American character today as they were in 1776. They account, I think, in no small measure, for the "idealism" which has been characteristic of our country. We do believe that the world can be made better; we do believe that the God-given rights of freedom, justice, and equality of opportunity are truths against which the actions of a nation must be judged.

This moral and idealistic approach to our own problems has direct bearing and influence upon our relations with other governments. Though sometimes our motivations are blurred by what must seem to Europeans as excessive impatience, naïveté, or disregard for history, and while our actions sometimes may appear overly moralistic, they are usually based to a greater or lesser degree on our beliefs in the spiritual character and dignity of the human being and his relationship to the State. It is, therefore, a logical outgrowth of our whole philosophy of life to recognize the hopes and desires, the rights and voices of other nations when we embark on any great venture. Today we have embarked on the greatest venture of our history—the world struggle to maintain freedom.

We are fortunate in having firm friends, you among them, who share those beliefs.

U. S. Cooperation With Free Nations

It is an interesting paradox that by its actions the Soviet regime has strengthened the moral and spiritual ties we have with other countries. Those actions have brought us closer to other nations, who, with ourselves, cannot, could never, agree with the main tenets of communism or the ruthless methods of their enforcement.

From earliest Czarist times, Russia has been remote and difficult of access. The vast gap in mutual understanding which unfortunately has existed between Russia and the West—stemming as it does from differences in race, environment,

geography, and other factors which make it almost unbridgeable at best—has been made wider by the deliberate use of distortion and the “big lie” as a major tactical weapon by the Kremlin. Words which we accept as truthful expressions of a nation’s policy lose their meaning in Moscow and actions have no relation to words. In my 30 odd years in this profession, I have always believed that the most effective diplomacy, as well as the most honorable, is to say exactly what you mean; to lay your cards face up on the table. That is precisely what my Government does. The late Marshal Stalin, whom I met at several conferences, however, had different ideas. “A diplomat’s word,” he once said, “must have no relation to actions, otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are masks for concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron.”

We abhor such concepts. They are as foreign to our philosophy and to our way of life as the vast steppes which nourished them.

The American character and the nature of Soviet aggression were, in my opinion, dominant factors leading toward our cooperation with other nations. This cooperation, it is true, was not immediate. We did withdraw our forces from abroad immediately after the last war. War weary, and hoping for the best, we wished to resume the ways of peace and to have our men back home. But the situation in Europe was desperate, as I am sure everyone in this audience knows. It was imperative, as the American people realized, for the United States to assume a position, however reluctantly, of leadership among the nations.

We need time to grow accustomed to this leadership and to our responsibilities. The Great Powers of Europe, the Dutch, the British, the French, the Spanish, had many years in which to evolve their roles of leading the world and to habituate themselves to their international responsibilities of the period. The tempo of the times was infinitely slower; events developed in leisurely fashion. Policy was formed by the few and accepted by the many. It is quite different now when pressure is constant and the speed of events fantastically swift. What is said or done in Washington, London, Moscow, or Tokyo is known in minutes by millions around the world. The impact, for better or for worse, of the marvels of today’s telecommunications has revolutionized the whole field of human psychological relationships. This, and the staggering complexities of life in the modern world have rendered vastly more difficult our quick transition and acclimation to a role of leadership. And quite frankly it seems to me we have made good progress.

But we have also had our frustrations: the Korean War was confusing to many Americans. We looked back with longing to the good old days when whatever happened beyond the shores of

our continent, however grave for others, need hardly spoil the flavor of our breakfast eggs and coffee. We were, at first, not sufficiently aware of Korea’s implications, of the reasons why we had to act as we did; and the fighting dragged on interminably. The great question was “Why don’t we finish it”? But it became apparent to civilian and soldier alike that we fought for a definite and vital objective—to prevent the creeping enslavement of our world and the annihilation of our way of life. We fought in Korea, as did you, in order not to fight some day in Kansas City or again in Arnhem.

So, fundamentally and basically the American people have given wholehearted support to the very practical theory that they must live and work together in concert with other nations of a similar mind. In so doing they have, I think, resisted to an unusual degree the very natural temptation of trying to make their own ideas predominate. They realize that each nation from its culture, tradition, and history can and does contribute its ideas and its strength to keeping the free world free.

Postwar Participation in Free World Effort

You know well of our cooperation during World War II. Let me mention briefly some of the major steps we have taken to cooperate with others since the war: our participation in the United Nations, in the valiant resistance of Greece to Communist invasion and in support of our Turkish ally, in the Marshall plan, in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the Korean struggle, in the challenging point 4 program, our support of the European Defense Community, and finally our President’s recent proposals for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

First, we joined with other countries in the establishment of the United Nations, the formation of which was a truly great historical event. Despite all the disappointments since the San Francisco conference, we should continue to bear in mind that the United Nations represents a sincere and honest attempt to join the nations of the world together for the supreme objective of keeping the peace. If public expectations of its early powers of persuasion were unfortunately exaggerated, it has nonetheless proved to be the most useful forum of our postwar era in which the forces of public opinion can best be brought to bear on the many problems of our day.

In the economic sphere we have cooperated and will continue to cooperate with our allies. The Marshall plan is so familiar to you all that it requires no emphasis on my part. Suffice it to say that the money expended has borne good fruit. Especially, is that true in this country. I like to think that by this assistance we have repaid the loan you made in 1782 to John Adams, who, by appointment from the Continental Congress, was

the first American Minister to the Netherlands. It is amusing to recall that, in 1792, instructions were given John Adams' son, John Quincy Adams, my distinguished predecessor, who spent some of his student days at the University of Leiden, that his principal duties at The Hague would be to "borrow money and superintend the loan already existing."

The next important step after the Marshall plan was our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty. Joining NATO was for the United States a revolutionary step. For the first time in our history we pledged ourselves to give of our blood and of our wealth, not at our own will and timing, but whenever any member nation should be attacked. Make no mistake, we shall stand by that pledge. In evidence thereof is the fact that to date we have expended one thousand million dollars in equipping the armed forces of your country alone. It is my firm conviction that our men will not be withdrawn, our material aid will not end so long as they are needed.

Within the framework of the United Nations, specifically article 51, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become a vital instrument for collective security. The voice of each member is heard; the nations work together in harmony and for all-important purposes—to keep the peace and to insure the continued strength of the area the treaty embraces. Quite apart from its character as an organization for our common defense, however, it is a body through which the member states can further their collective well-being. This was made plain by the declaration of the members of the North Atlantic Council following their meeting in Lisbon in February of 1952.⁴ It said:

The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty is not for defense alone but of enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their association can be less concentrated on defense and more fully devoted to cooperation in other fields, for the well-being of their peoples and for the advancement of human progress.

To be sure, at the present time, the defensive aspects of NATO are of primary concern to us, and pertinent to these defensive aspects is Lenin's so-called "Tidal Theory of Revolution," so basic to all Kremlin policies. I consider an understanding of Lenin's theory of utmost importance to us all. Let me briefly remind you what it means: Lenin reasoned that any process which is not completely planned has its ups and downs. Since history is not a completely planned process, the revolutionary movement of Bolshevism (a part of history) necessarily has an ebb and flow. It follows that one should always ride with the tide and should push one's future to the limit when the tide is in flood. An ebb is bound to come, however, and when it comes, one should again ride with the tide. Then it behooves the Communist Party to lie low, said Lenin. Take one step back-

⁴ *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 368.

ward in order to take two steps forward at a later date. Parenthetically I might add that, of all people in the world, you Dutch are most aware of the importance of dikes when the tide is in flood.

In Europe, with NATO as our major instrument, we, together with our allies, have, I think, brought the tide to a stand and we must keep it there. At the same time we must seize every opportunity by peaceful means, and I stress the word peaceful, to induce it to recede.

The Soviet regime concedes only what is forced upon it by strength but our strength can be effective only if we are really prepared to use it. In Korea, the free world showed its preparedness to stand together. While I would not say that the tide has been halted throughout Asia it has been checked in Korea and it has been retarded elsewhere. And had we not acted in Korea as we did, the creeping enslavement of which I spoke would surely have paralyzed the world. The Kremlin took a calculated risk and lost. It would, in my view, never have set in motion the invasion of South Korea had it believed we would react as we did.

Next, we have thrown our full support behind the efforts of Western Europe to increase its strength through the European Defense Community. Important in this support is our belief that although the Soviet Union in action is highly opportunist, its method is consistent: it is the method of trial and error. The less we in the West seem ready to meet aggression, the more the Soviet will probe our solidarity, our strength of purpose, and our will to oppose its predatory moves. You in the Netherlands understand, of course, as fully as do we the importance of the European Defense Community and have demonstrated that fact by ratifying the treaty at the timely moment just before Berlin.

The last evidence of cooperation which I shall mention tonight is that of the peaceful use of atomic power. The President's speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8 was of great significance; its importance has been recognized. Here we have a concrete proposal for sharing the knowledge of the world's scientists for the abundant welfare of all nations. This tremendous scientific development can become the greatest force for good or the greatest force for evil in the world's history. It must be for the good.

Berlin Conference

May I now touch on a recent political development of great importance to us all. At the Berlin conference, which has just closed, the Western Powers sought in good faith to do their utmost to bridge the differences between East and West. Unfortunately the Soviet attitude deprived their efforts of success. The Conference itself, however, has been important. It has proved con-

clusively that the free world will stand together in spite of Soviet efforts to substitute words for deeds in its major objective to destroy the Western unity which is our strength. Stalin himself, in 1929, said "It is not for nothing that the proverb says 'an obliging bear is more dangerous than an enemy'." The bear has been obliging, but he tempted no one and he gave up none of his prey.

Gogol in his masterpiece "Dead Souls" long before Lenin or Stalin appeared on the horizon seemingly forecast the Soviet attitude at the Berlin conference. His advice, which Mr. Molotov so ably and enthusiastically followed, comes from that wonderful character of Chichikov. Chichikov said:

Remain calm, let nothing embarrass you, however bad things may get. Never despair of anything: there is no case that can't be saved. . . . If you see that things are approaching decision, don't try to justify and defend yourself; no, just mix things up by bringing in new elements. Mix things up, and mix them up again, that's all. Introduce extraneous factors so that others get involved as well as yourself. Why you can muddy the waters, if you want, so that no one will ever be able to make head or tail of them. And after all, your opponent only catches crayfish in muddy waters.

A ray of hope resulted from the Conference, however, the agreement to hold talks in Geneva in April on Korea and Indochina. And on its terms of reference the West stood fast. Mr. Molotov's "concession"—as it is made to appear—on this point I believe is largely designed further to delay France's great parliamentary decision on the ratification of the European Defense Community. But, whatever the outcome at Geneva, the Western three have remained firmly united on the questions of Germany, Austria and the Far East, and are closer than ever before in their common point of view.

What lessons can we learn from Berlin? I think it is quite clear that we must continue our efforts to strengthen the free world. We must do so in the knowledge that Mr. Molotov and his associates for reasons made abundantly clear will not permit the unification of Germany in freedom or the removal of occupation forces from Austria. The urgent necessity for the ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty by the nations concerned is now all too obvious. The prevention of its entry into force was one of Russia's principal objectives. The alternative sought by Mr. Molotov is the abandonment of Western defense while the great Eurasian power retains its full and threatening strength.

The outrageous denial of an Austrian settlement proves clearly to me what wishful thinking has sometimes obscured, namely, that the Soviet leaders fear anything they do not control by force. It is certainly not fear of Austrian military might; Austria pledged itself to neutrality. It is the fear of an idea, the idea of freedom. The Western

proposals for Germany, based as they were on principles of free choice, were unacceptable to Russia for the very same reason. The Soviet leaders have, indeed, denied hope *for the present* to the peoples of Germany and Austria. They have shown they fear above all to relax their severe but uneasy grip on the areas their police power now dominates. They fear the consequences of a withdrawal once initiated. They are thus faced with a terrible dilemma. They have today, I believe, a baffling conflict of interest: on the one hand is their internal need to bring about a relaxation of world tensions; on the other hand, they have grave forebodings lest the very tangible acts required to produce this relaxation may well set in motion such irresistible centrifugal forces in their part-slave empire as to render precarious their own position of internal power. Turning their backs on the Atlantic Charter to which we all subscribed and which called for "freedom from fear," they have forced a great part of the world to suffer the anguish of their state of mind: "the fear of freedom."

In this connection, I believe, Secretary Dulles' final remarks at the Conference bear repeating.⁵ He said:

This is not the time or the place to discuss philosophies of creeds. It is, however, important to observe that all of our basic differences here have revolved around the question of whether it was right, or indeed safe, to give men and nations a genuine freedom of choice.

The Western Powers were willing to place trust in the German and Austrian peoples. The Soviet Union was not.

The Soviet delegation, in multiple ways, has made manifest its fear of freedom and its determination, through its occupation forces and its control of election processes, to try to make certain that freedom cannot be exercised in a way which might be prejudicial to it.

Clearly the Kremlin did not want the Berlin conference to result in any major agreements. Clearly European security means to the Soviet Union destroying the security of our world and strengthening the Kremlin's hold on its satellite states—and in fact placing itself in position to dictate to the whole of Europe. To the West, European security means building peace through cooperation of the nations.

As I said at the beginning of these thoughts I have brought you tonight, it is in that spirit of free cooperation, I am confident, the nations of the free world will go forward. It is that spirit which motivated Mr. Dulles when he said:

The three Western Ministers, each acting freely for his sovereign and independent nation, have found agreement on every aspect of our work. Thus we have exemplified a society of consent. If, in that spirit, our nations go on with others of like mind, to build the strength of freedom, then we shall win, everywhere, respect. It will be shared by all who look to us for leadership, for we shall be guarding and serving their freedom, with our own.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 317.

Greece and Free World Defense

by Henry A. Byroade

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

As you know from my introduction, my responsibilities in the Department of State involve the relations between the United States and the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. This huge area is of utmost importance in the free-world struggle with Soviet imperialism.

For your part, you are men of business brought together in this organization by a specific interest in Greece. Since this good friend and ally of the United States falls within the area of my concern, and since the Greek people have been in the vanguard of the defenders of freedom, I feel justified in assuming that we start with many interests in common.

Anyone who has had close connection with international affairs and with the conduct of foreign policy realizes that the formal dealings between governments are by no means the beginning and the end of international relations. Intergovernmental exchanges are the surface and the framework. The body of international relations, however, is made up of private contacts and dealings which one people has with another. Clearly, it means little if understandings are reached at official levels which do not penetrate the private activities which go on between the peoples concerned.

It is obvious that United States policies evolved in Washington cannot be fully realized unless private organizations such as the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce, to cite one of many, are ready and willing to help us give it substance.

Consequently, in talking with you, I speak as one partner to another. I hope that you will consider my talk from that point of view.

Greek-American Relations

My remarks tonight are not primarily concerned with American-Greek relations or with American

policy toward Greece. One reason is that the relations between the two countries have remained on the friendliest basis since the emergence of Greece as a modern nation in the early 19th century. Another reason is that American policy toward Greece, particularly since the dark days of World War II, has been so clear that it needs no restatement. This country has extended and is continuing to extend direct military as well as defense support aid to Greece. The gallant Greek people have come through the last decade and a half of strife and disaster with colors flying. In World War II they fought magnificently against overwhelming odds. Although defeated in the field by immensely superior forces, and subjected to a ruthless and oppressive occupation, they refused to submit to tyranny. They continued to resist. When the tyrant was finally defeated, the war-weary but undaunted Greek people set about clearing away the wreckage left by the fighting, and restoring both their economic and political structure.

From the moment of setting out on this path of return, the Greek people and Government were harassed and impeded by a Communist conspiracy, fomented from beyond Greek borders, to turn Greece into a Communist satellite state. In an effort to overthrow the established Greek Government, the Communist guerrillas launched a campaign of terror which threatened the very existence of the nation and which developed into a full-scale war. After 3 bitter years, the Greek Army decisively defeated these foreign-inspired guerrillas, and gave international communism one of its most serious setbacks at a moment when the free world was badly disorganized. Throughout this period of trial, the United States was able to offer effective help. Military assistance from America was a factor in the suppression of the guerrillas. Economic aid helped Greece reconstruct its economy, and technical assistance of various kinds contributed to essential improvements in health and sanitation and lifted levels of production.

¹ Address made before the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce, New York, N. Y., on Mar. 5 (press release 113).

When the misery and devastation which prevailed in 1946 is considered, and when we think of the hardships suffered during World War II, as well as after, and when we recognize that the Greek people fought and defeated large armed guerrilla bands, only then is it possible to put into true perspective the nation's tremendous achievements. Certainly the aid provided by the United States was a vital factor. But the indispensable elements were the drive, the courage, and the vitality of the Greek people and their determination to be free.

I pay them a full measure of tribute.

At the present time the Soviets and their European satellites have adopted a calculated strategy of attempting to confuse the Greek people by assuming a mask of loving-kindness.

But Greece knows full well that Soviet imperialism respects only those who have the will and the means to resist aggression. Accordingly, she has allocated to her defense the maximum resources consistent with the maintenance of a balance between security requirements and the requirements of a stable economy.

The balance between security requirements and the requirements for a continuously rising standard of living is always delicate, never static. We recognize, as does the Greek Government, that an effective solution of the problem of security must be one which can endure for a long period of time. We recognize and sympathize with the Greek people's desire to expand their economy as well as to provide for their security. The United States has assisted and will continue to assist in this effort.

In other words, as between ourselves and the Greeks, there is a true and effective cooperation in matters of defense. The Greeks, for their part, have made a brilliant effort to achieve a satisfactory defense against aggression. The United States, for its part, has provided materiel and equipment for the Greek military establishment. It has also continued financial assistance to the Greek economy both in terms of dollars and in terms of drachmae support to the Greek defense budget.

The Greek effort has added significantly not only to her own national security—but also to the security of the NATO area as a whole.

I had the pleasure at the airport in Washington this morning of welcoming Mr. Kannellopoulos, the Greek Minister of Defense, to the United States. His visit provides another opportunity to exchange views on these vital issues which are continuously under review by our Governments. We welcome his visit.

Soviet Policy and the Free World

In addition to ties of cooperation between Greece and the United States, our two nations are bound together by the fact that we both face a

problem, a menace, which confronts the entire free world, and one upon which our survival may turn. I refer to the threat of Soviet imperialism.

Now, as in the past, Soviet free world relations turn, in the main, on the aggressive nature of Soviet policy.

Since the last meeting of Foreign Ministers 5 years ago, much has happened which could have had an impact on the thinking and the plans of the Kremlin leaders. The strength of the West has increased sharply. NATO is a going concern and has been broadened to include Greece and Turkey. European unification is moving ahead. Stalin has died. Meanwhile, the United Nations resisted Communist aggression in Korea—and drove the aggressors back of their line of departure. A truce has been made, in the course of which the Chinese Communists have been put on notice that if they violated the truce or renewed their aggression, the 16 fighting members of the United Nations Command would be prompt to resist and "in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea." In addition, the free nations have insisted on nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war and have carried their point.

At the same time, it was difficult to tell what or how much influence these developments exerted on the policy of the Soviet leaders. Obviously, unless we could obtain a satisfactory picture of the intentions of the Kremlin, we would be hampered in putting our own policy into effect. Were such small concessions as the Kremlin seemed to make straws in the wind or bait for the unwary? A test of Soviet intentions was in order. We therefore agreed to a meeting at Berlin of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union to negotiate a settlement of two specific problems—the unification of Germany and a treaty for Austria.

I would like to emphasize what I know that you know, that we went to the Berlin conference in good faith. We were not using the German and Austrian matters as pawns in a global game of chess with the Soviet Union. We were prepared to agree to any practical and genuine proposal which would end the division of Germany and restore to the German people their independence. And we were willing to consider any legitimate arrangements for the completion of the liberation of Austria.

I will grant that we were not optimistic on either score. But we were determined to try.

You are all too familiar with the results of the Berlin conference. The discussions achieved neither the reunification of Germany nor a treaty for Austria. But what they did do was to force Mr. Molotov to show Russia's hand and to draw the three Western Powers even more closely together. Russia's hand, as Secretary Dulles put it, was seen "as a hand that held fast to everything it had, including East Germany and East Austria,

and also it sought to grab some more." Not only the conferees in Berlin but a listening world learned the nature and shape of today's Soviet policy. Revealed in its true proportions, that policy had no post-Stalin "new look", unless you could so term the fear of freedom implicit in its every detail.

Regional Groupings and Free World Defense

To the anti-Communist world, the results of the test of Soviet intentions which was made at Berlin have deep significance. The unchanged Soviet tenets strongly accent the need for effective regional security arrangements. Further the Soviet attitude underscores the desirability of an interlock between regional organizations wherever practical so that there may be maximum coordination on security matters.

As the President recently stated, "regional groups to ensure security against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure survival and progress."

As friends of Greece we all know about the role that the Greek nation has played in the European regional defensive organization. The inclusion of Greece in NATO substantially increased the forces available to dissuade aggression. These forces, which have demonstrated their bravery in Korea, have been joined with the Southeast European Land Force Command, where along with their Turkish neighbors they stand guard over the strategic flank of the NATO defense system.

Regional collective security, in which Greece has shown its firm belief, has made impressive strides forward in Europe. Individual national armies have been consolidated into a coordinated force. Individual defense plans have gained in strength through overall planning for defense of the NATO area as a whole. The doubts and qualms of isolated action have been dispelled and replaced by the will to fight for common causes. Year by year NATO grows stronger.

Greece has also played a leading role in developing a new regional grouping in an area where traditional distrust and historical rivalries have frequently in the past flared into armed conflict. I refer to the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav Treaty of Cooperation signed in Ankara on February 28 of last year. By this realistic and statesmanlike action three contiguous nations bordering on the Soviet empire have made clear to the world, and served notice to the satellites, that they recognize their mutuality of interest in security matters and are in a position to work together harmoniously in the event of unprovoked aggression. This rapprochement certainly represents an element of strength in a vital area, and the resultant pact, with its provision for the adherence of other like-minded nations in that part of the world, should prove a valuable deterrent to any aggressive intentions from the Balkan countries to the north.

If we look to the east of Greece, in that area that we loosely term the Middle East, I am glad to report that here, as well, there seems to be a growing interest in the kind of regional defense that Berlin showed to be essential.

The United States has long been concerned about the defense of the Middle East. That concern has increased of late to a point where it might be called a major preoccupation of the administration. There has also been a gradual increase in public awareness of the immense importance of the Middle East, both from the point of view of an appreciation of the human and material resources of the area as well as its strategic location. All efforts to see the states in the area, and those nations of the free world who were in a position to help in the defense of the Middle East, join together in a common defense organization have failed. This has been true primarily because of the extreme sensitivity of newly independent nations over their sovereignty and because of their preoccupation with other issues.

This situation was recognized by the Secretary of State last June when he returned from his trip through that area. The Secretary stressed that while a regional defense grouping would in our opinion be beneficial to the Middle East, the people of the area themselves should initiate the arrangement out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. He further stated that the United States while awaiting such developments would help where it could to strengthen the defenses of those countries who wanted strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

These ideas reflect the policy of the United States as it has developed since the visit by the Secretary to the Middle East some 9 months ago. What is being said now is in the nature of a progress report along these lines. It is, moreover, progress of the best possible kind, in which free nations of their own volition have taken steps for their own welfare, and which coincide with what we consider to be the welfare of the United States.

On February 19, Turkey and Pakistan announced their intention to study methods of achieving closer collaboration between their countries, including means designed to strengthen peace and security.² This move has given real impetus to the hope for an effective defense of the area as a whole. It is, in my opinion, the most far-reaching and important constructive step in the Middle East since I have been charged with my present responsibility. This Government warmly welcomed this move by Turkey and Pakistan. The President responded shortly thereafter with a statement that we were ready to respond affirmatively to Pakistan's request for assistance in strengthening her own defenses.³

² For a Department statement on the announcement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1954, p. 327.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1954, p. 400.

In this tightening of bonds between Turkey and Pakistan, this Government sees nothing but the creation of strength of a purely defensive nature. It unites those who in our opinion see the danger of free peoples from the same sources that we see that danger. It unites people who share a determination to do all they can, on their own, to resist such threats to their freedom and security.

We hope that other nations will see attraction in this move sponsored by the two powers flanking the Middle East. I do not believe this to be a forlorn hope. Other nations in the Middle East, I am confident, will recognize the purely defensive nature of the arrangement. Such developments must come by the will of the nations themselves although our interest in such a trend would be great.

This is a world full of anxiety and fear. Some, at times, become pessimistic as to the future.

Those who feel that way fail, in my opinion, to take into account constructive bonds that are steadily growing among the free peoples on this earth. To me, the picture of friendly dependence upon neighbors and allies by the members of regional groupings such as I have outlined tonight in Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East, is tremendously encouraging.

When I say this I am thinking perhaps even more of the political point of view than I am in terms of straight military preparedness. The bonds that are being formed by a sense of common danger are daily giving evidence that nations are willing to subordinate many of their traditional national rivalries and frictions for the common good. I sincerely believe that this is necessary not only to win a struggle that might be thrust upon the free world, but more importantly—to prevent such a catastrophe from happening at all.

Commercial Treaty With Israel

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 107 dated March 4

The instruments of ratification of the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and Israel were exchanged on March 4 in Washington. The exchange was made by Acting Secretary of State Smith and Abba Eban, the Ambassador of Israel, at a brief ceremony. This action completes the formal procedures connected with bringing the treaty into force. By its terms the treaty will enter into force on April 3, the 30th day following the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty was signed at Washington on August 23, 1951. It was approved by the United States Senate on July 21 of last year, subject to a reservation regarding the practice of professions, and by the Government of Israel on January 6, 1952. It was ratified by President Eisenhower on December 18, 1953, and Israel completed its ratification procedures on January 21, 1954.

Entry into force of the new treaty marks the establishment of formal treaty relations of a general character between the two countries. The treaty is the first of its kind to be concluded by Israel and the sixth of this general type which the United States has brought into force with individual foreign countries since the end of World War II. It is designed to regulate basic economic relations between the contracting parties in accord-

ance with advanced and enlightened standards of treatment and to furnish a stable and enduring basis for their future economic intercourse. It contains provisions on basic personal freedoms, property rights, investment and business activities generally, taxation, exchange regulations, the treatment of imports and exports, shipping, and other matters affecting the status and activities of the citizens and enterprises of either country when within the territories of the other.

SUMMARY OF SIMILAR TREATIES

Upon entry into force the treaty with Israel will be the sixth postwar addition to the network of bilateral treaties which the United States long has sought to develop in furtherance of orderly and mutually beneficial economic relationships with other countries. It is one of 10 such treaties signed since the close of World War II as part of an intensive effort to expand and modernize this treaty network. The other postwar treaties which have come into effect are with Ireland, Italy, Ethiopia, Japan, and China. The treaties signed with Denmark, Greece, Colombia, and Uruguay have not as yet been ratified.¹

¹ For a Department statement before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee considering these treaties and that with Israel, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1952, p. 881.

The existing treaty network is rounded out by 30 treaties entered into at various times before World War II which are still in effect in whole or in greater part. Fourteen of these treaties were entered into during the period between the two world wars, as part of a program initiated by Charles Evans Hughes while he was Secretary of State. The remainder were concluded at various times during the 19th century or the first years of this century; in fact, 11 of them were negotiated over 100 years ago. These various treaties, while dealing with the same general range of subject matter, were concluded over a long span of time and under widely differing circumstances and consequently vary greatly from the standpoint of responsiveness to the requirements of present-day economic intercourse.

TREATIES SIGNED SINCE WORLD WAR II

- China*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Nanking Nov. 4, 1946 (entered into force Nov. 30, 1948).
- Colombia*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Washington Apr. 26, 1951 (not in force).
- Denmark*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Copenhagen Oct. 1, 1951 (not in force).
- Ethiopia*—Treaty of amity and economic relations signed at Addis Ababa Sept. 7, 1951 (entered into force Oct. 8, 1953).
- Greece*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Athens Aug. 3, 1951 (not in force).
- Ireland*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Dublin Jan. 21, 1950 (entered into force Sept. 14, 1950).
- Israel*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Washington Aug. 23, 1951 (to enter into force Apr. 3, 1954).
- Italy*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Rome Feb. 2, 1948 (entered into force July 26, 1949).
- Japan*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Tokyo Apr. 2, 1953 (entered into force Oct. 30, 1953).
- Uruguay*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and economic development signed at Montevideo Nov. 23, 1949 (not in force).

TREATIES CONCLUDED 1920-1940

- Austria*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Vienna June 19, 1928.
- El Salvador*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at San Salvador Feb. 22, 1926.
- Estonia*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Washington Dec. 23, 1925.
- Finland*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Washington Feb. 13, 1934.
- Germany*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Washington Dec. 8, 1923 (the status of some provisions of this treaty is uncertain, pending entry into force of the agreement of June 3, 1953, relating to reapplication of the treaty).
- Greece*—Treaty of establishment signed at Athens Nov. 21, 1936.
- Honduras*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Tegucigalpa Dec. 7, 1927.
- Iraq*—Treaty of commerce and navigation signed at Baghdad Dec. 3, 1938.
- Latvia*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Riga Apr. 20, 1928.

- Liberia*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Monrovia Aug. 8, 1938.
- Norway*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and consular rights signed at Washington June 5, 1928.
- Thailand*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Bangkok Nov. 13, 1937.
- Turkey*—Treaty of commerce and navigation signed at Ankara Oct. 1, 1929.
- Turkey*—Treaty of establishment and sojourn signed at Ankara Oct. 28, 1931.

TREATIES CONCLUDED BEFORE 1920

- Argentina*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at San José July 27, 1853.
- Belgium*—Treaty of commerce and navigation signed at Washington Mar. 8, 1875.
- Bolivia*—Treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at La Paz May 13, 1858.
- Borneo*—Convention of amity, commerce, and navigation signed at Brunel June 28, 1850.
- Colombia*—Treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and commerce signed at Bogotá Dec. 12, 1846.
- Costa Rica*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Washington July 10, 1851.
- Denmark*—Convention of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Washington Apr. 26, 1826.
- France*—Convention of navigation and commerce signed at Washington June 24, 1822.
- Morocco*—Treaty of peace and friendship signed at Meknes Sept. 16, 1836.
- Muscat*—Treaty of amity and commerce signed at Muscat Sept. 21, 1833.
- Netherlands*—Convention of commerce and navigation signed at Washington Aug. 26, 1852.
- Paraguay*—Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation signed at Asunción Feb. 4, 1859.
- Spain*—Treaty of friendship and general relations signed at Madrid July 3, 1902.
- Switzerland*—Convention of friendship, commerce, and extradition signed at Bern Nov. 25, 1850.
- United Kingdom*—Convention to regulate commerce and navigation signed at London July 3, 1815.
- Yugoslavia*—Treaty of commerce and navigation signed at Belgrade Oct. 14, 1881.

Letters of Credence

Ceylon

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ceylon, R. S. S. Gunewardene, presented his credentials to the President on March 10. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 125.

Austria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Austria, Dr. Karl Gruber, presented his credentials to the President on March 10. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 126.

The Middle East and South Asia—the Problem of Security

by John D. Jernegan

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs¹

The general subject of the Middle East is an extremely broad one. If I were to attempt to cover all aspects of American relations with that area it would take more time than is available and would probably be beyond my capacity. It seemed to me, therefore, that it would be best to confine myself to one aspect which has been very much in the news in recent weeks, that is, the problem of developing a security system for the area, the beginning which may have been made toward a solution of this problem through the decision of Turkey and Pakistan to institute closer relations between themselves,² and the decision of the American Government to accede to Pakistan's request for military assistance.

For at least 2 centuries, since the decline of the Ottoman Empire began, there has been little or no indigenous defensive strength in the Middle East and South Asia. In consequence, that area has been the object of great power rivalries. One of the outstanding elements in the picture was the recurrent drive of imperial Russia to the south and east. This drive met with little resistance from the Middle Eastern states themselves and was held in check only by the counterweight of other European powers, especially Britain and France. During the 19th century, Britain established a firm base in the Indian subcontinent and another base in the Near East. As a result, the area from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Pacific enjoyed a sort of *Pax Britannica*. Whatever judgment may be passed on British rule and British influence from the point of view of the inhabitants of the area itself, this provided a degree of stability and prevented an overturn of the world balance of forces.

After World War II the basis of British power in the Middle East and South Asia was reduced.

¹ Address made before the Institute of International Affairs, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, on Mar. 7 (press release 114 dated Mar. 6).

² For a statement by the Department on the joint communiqué by Turkey and Pakistan, see BULLETIN of Mar. 1, 1954, p. 327.

Britain withdrew from the Indian subcontinent, from Burma, from Ceylon, and from Palestine. She also felt obliged to relinquish her direct responsibility for support of Greece and Turkey. This left the states concerned free to pursue their own nationalist aspirations in their own way, but it also left them largely defenseless against a predatory great power, and unfortunately Soviet ambitions in that direction did not end with the overthrow of the Czarist regime.

It is significant to note that the secret Nazi Germany-U.S.S.R. draft agreement of November 26, 1940, contains the following passage: "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."³ Since 1940 we have had abundant evidence that the Soviets still feel the same way. An outstanding example was their attempt to take over control of Iranian Azerbaijan in 1945 and 1946.

Visibility of Kremlin's Hand

We have no evidence to show that since Stalin's death Soviet objectives have changed. Moscow-directed attempts at subversion continue. I do not believe there is a single country in the Middle East where the hand of the Kremlin does not show. In some, such as Turkey, strong governmental action has made these efforts extremely difficult. In others, however, the machinations of the local Communists contribute greatly to internal instability.

Thus, the security of the Middle East and South Asia has necessarily become a source of deep concern to the free world. While the United States was willing and able to assume the responsibility of strengthening Greece and Turkey and was able to carry it out with success, it has not been possible to apply the same technique to the security problems of the far greater area lying to the south and east of Turkey. Many of the countries

³ *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941*, Department of State publication 3023, p. 257.

of that region have not felt it in their national interest to request American assistance. In others, a grant of American military assistance on the scale of that provided to Greece and Turkey would be beyond the capacity of the countries concerned to assimilate and utilize. Furthermore, I need hardly say that American resources are not unlimited. Nevertheless, the danger of aggression exists in the Middle East no less than in the Far East and in Europe. The nations of the free world could not ignore it and have not ignored it. They have considered it essential that the area be enabled to develop peacefully, free from the danger of being swallowed by Soviet communism.

You undoubtedly recall that there were discussions in 1951 about the establishment of a Middle East Command to be sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and certain British dominions and to include the Arab States.⁴ This proposal met with little enthusiasm on the part of the Near Eastern states, which were too preoccupied with their disputes with the West and the hostility between the Arabs and Israel to wish to engage in a general defensive arrangement under Western leadership.

In 1952 consideration was given to the possible formation of what was called a Middle East Defense Organization, which was to have been a much looser grouping designed primarily for cooperative defense planning.⁵ This, again, failed to attract the interest of the Near Eastern states whose participation would have been essential for its success.

When Secretary of States Dulles took office last year he decided to have a new look at the whole problem of the Near East and South Asia, including the security situation. In the spring of 1953 he made an extensive tour of the area. He traveled many thousands of miles and spoke at length with leaders of government. When he returned, he had this to say about the problem of defense:⁶

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger.

There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.

While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

⁴For a summary of the discussions, see BULLETIN of Nov. 26, 1951, p. 842 and Dec. 15, 1952, p. 937.

⁵For a statement regarding U.S. efforts, see *ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 938.

⁶*Ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. 835.

I believe the key to the future of collective security in the Middle East lies in what Secretary Dulles said about its having to spring from within—that it cannot be forced on the area from the outside. Both the idea of the Middle East Command and that of the Middle East Defense Organization foundered because they relied on initiative being supplied from the West.

Divergence of Views Regarding Danger

There is still no unanimity among the states of the Middle East and South Asia regarding the best means of preserving their freedom. There is not even agreement among them, in all cases, as to the nature or imminence of the threat to their security. Some of them, conditioned by past experience or influenced by immediate problems, still seem to believe that they are as much endangered by an "imperialist threat" from the west as by peril from the north. Others have come to feel, rightly in our opinion, that the overriding danger is that of Communist expansionism. This is the conclusion which has been reached by the Government of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, high officials of the Government of Pakistan, in informal conversations, had indicated to us months ago their interest in strengthening Pakistan and had made clear that Pakistan recognized the dangers the free world faced. For our part, we had been considering the potential possessed by Pakistan in connection with the problem of increasing the defensive strength of the Middle East. While this question was still under study within the American Government, the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan began to consider the advantages of closer cooperation between themselves in the political, economic, cultural, and security fields. The United States Government was aware of this line of thinking, which it welcomed and which resulted in a joint announcement by the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan on February 19 of this year that they intended "to study methods of achieving closer friendly collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural spheres as well as of strengthening peace and security in their own interest as also in that of all peace-loving nations."

Meanwhile, the American Government had been pondering the pros and cons of extending grant military aid to Pakistan. There were obvious advantages. The Government of Pakistan had shown its awareness of the danger, and in the state of the world today it did not seem good policy to rebuff those who think as we do and who can contribute to the security of the free world on which our own security depends. Pakistan has concrete assets to offer to the free world. She has a fine army which provided a large share of distinguished regiments to the Indian Army before partition—regiments noted for bravery in two world wars. She has ample manpower to expand that

army. Her military tradition and ability are proved. She occupies an important location covering the invasion routes into the Indian subcontinent and also one which would enable her, under conditions of strength, to support the defense of the Near East proper.

To realize her potential, however, Pakistan needs outside assistance. She does not have the raw materials or the productive capacity to arm herself sufficiently to withstand outside aggression.

On the opposite side, the Government of the United States had to consider and did consider the attitude of Pakistan's great neighbor, India.

India-Pakistan Relations

Since the partition of the subcontinent between India and Pakistan in 1947, relations between the two countries have been strained. The violence which accompanied the separation and which was followed by the clash over the State of Kashmir resulted in differences which have been exceedingly difficult to resolve. We feared, and subsequent evidence has borne out our fears, that many Indians would dislike the prospect of military assistance to a neighboring country with whom they were not on the best of terms. Indian spokesmen have expressed anxiety that military assistance would make Pakistan more aggressive and would make the Pakistani Government feel that it could wield a big stick with respect to Kashmir.

In addition, the problem was further complicated by the Indian Government's concept of India's role in world affairs. It has been described variously as the idea of a "no war area" or "neutral group" or as the center of a "neutral bloc." In the arguments against United States aid to Pakistan which have been advanced in India during the past few months, we find that one of the central themes is the fear that such a move would destroy the "neutrality" of the subcontinent and bring the cold war to India's borders.

In discussing United States military assistance in the Indian Council of States on December 24, 1953, Prime Minister Nehru said:

We have declared that we should be parties to no war. . . . We had hoped that other countries, more especially the countries of Asia which were situated more or less like us, would also follow that policy because it was to their advantage as well as to the larger advantage of Asia. . . . We, in our own way, worked for and looked forward to this area, if I may say so, as the "no-war area" in Asia. Naturally we hoped that Pakistan which was in a sense, similarly circumstanced as we are, would belong to that area also. Now, if any military aid comes to Pakistan from the United States it is obvious that Pakistan drops out of that area. Whatever else may happen, Pakistan lines up with a major group of powers. . . . That is a serious thing. It means that the cold war, as it is called, comes to Pakistan and, therefore, comes to India's borders on the West and the East, on both sides. It means that if a hot shooting war developed it also comes right up to the borders of India.

Mr. Nehru has also expressed the fear that military aid to an Asian country might be the opening wedge for the reintroduction of Western imperialism.

We must and do respect Mr. Nehru's opinions. He is the great leader of a great nation of 376 million people. He has been unswerving in his support for democracy and in his fight against Communists in his own country. There are strong traditions of friendship between the United States and India which must not be broken and which I am positive will be strengthened. But we feel entitled to differ with Mr. Nehru on policy matters involving our relations with other countries just as he is entitled to differ with us.

What has happened in Eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, the East Zone of Germany—what happened in Korea and Indochina, all point unmistakably to the glaring fact that the free peoples of the world are dealing with a conspiracy that has as its objective the enslavement of all of us. Our message is a simple one: If freedom is to survive it must be protected. Our technique for doing this—and it is a proven one—lies within the concept of collective security. We cannot allow peoples who want to live in peace and security to be picked off one by one. Our individual strengths are not sufficient to hold off the full power of the Soviets. Together, they are. We have proved in Korea that this idea is a valid one.

Strength a Deterrent to Attack

We do not, therefore, believe that the strengthening of freedom-loving nations invites attack. On the contrary, we think experience has shown that it is a deterrent to attack. We believe that in a matter of such great importance to both of them, Pakistan and the United States must follow their own convictions while at the same time fully respecting the convictions of others who honestly disagreed.

We do not, of course, agree that American aid to any country is a form of imperialism. In the light of India's history and the national feelings of her people we can understand why she is super-sensitive on this score, but we think a careful study of the history of American aid programs in other countries would show that her fears are unfounded. Nations such as Turkey, Greece, France, Great Britain, and many others have not surrendered their independence in receiving United States aid.

While the executive branch of your Government had the questions of military aid to Pakistan under consideration, we kept the Government of India informed of what would be involved. We assured it that no *quid pro quo* such as military bases was involved. I cannot say that we were successful in changing the attitudes of the Indian Government toward this proposal. We were in-

terested, however, in making it crystal clear exactly what such aid would entail.

In the meantime, the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan carried on informal talks which resulted in the February 19 announcement. As I have said, the United States warmly welcomed this development. It seemed to us that this step would provide increased assurance that these two countries and others in the area would be better able to keep their independence. Moreover, it was evidence that the need for collective security in the Middle East was being realized by the states of the area themselves, as Mr. Dulles had said it must be.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey explained the nature of the proposed agreement. He said: "The treaty to be concluded will not be an alliance or a military pact, but it will nevertheless envisage a common effort with a view to seeking and determining what may be done to strengthen peace and security, bearing in mind geo-political considerations, the possibilities of the two states, and what is feasible internationally." He went on to say that "the treaty in question will be open to interested peaceful states" and "that it will not and cannot be directed against any country of good will."

Military Aid for Pakistan

The decision of the United States to grant military aid to Pakistan was taken in the context of the announcement by Turkey and Pakistan and of Pakistan's formal request to us for aid.

In making its request known, the Government of Pakistan stated that it was asking the United States for this help "for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter." The statement went on to say that Pakistan was in agreement with the requirements of the mutual security legislation, under which the United States makes such grants available. This legislation strictly defines the end uses of grant military aid. It says, for instance, that the nation receiving aid shall agree that "the equipment, materials, or services provided will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures." The act further provides that the recipient nation agrees that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation.

On February 25, President Eisenhower announced that he was glad to comply with Pakistan's request. He said that the United States has "been gravely concerned over the weakness of defensive capabilities in the Middle East" and that

¹ *Ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1954, p. 401.

"regional groupings to ensure security against aggression constitute the most effective means to assure survival and progress." Thus, within the framework of the proposed agreement between Turkey and Pakistan, he decided to grant Pakistan military assistance.

Referring to the terms of the mutual security legislation, the President said: "These undertakings afford adequate assurance to all nations, regardless of their political orientation and whatever their international policies may be, that the arms the United States provides for the defense of the free world will in no way threaten their own security." "I can say," the President continued, "that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed against another in aggression I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority, appropriate action both within and without the U.N. to thwart such aggression. I would also consult with the Congress on further steps."

At the same time, the President made public the text of a personal letter he had sent to Prime Minister Nehru. In this letter he stated that the decision to give Pakistan aid "does not in any way affect the friendship we feel for India." He continued, "Our two Governments have agreed that our desires for peace are in accord. It has also been understood that if our interpretation of existing circumstances and our belief in how to achieve our goals differ, it is the right and duty of sovereign nations to make their own decisions."

He went on to cite the economic and technical assistance which the United States has provided India and the fact that he is recommending to the Congress that such help be continued. He concluded by noting that it is in the interest of the free world that India have a strong military establishment and that "If your Government should conclude that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most sympathetic consideration."

I should like to underline and paraphrase what the President said:

First, our Government is convinced that Pakistan desires our assistance and is seeking closer collaboration with Turkey solely to defend herself against aggression from outside the area. We do not believe that Pakistan has aggressive intentions toward any of her neighbors nor that she will adopt an intransigent attitude in the settlement of existing disputes.

Second, if contrary to our belief Pakistan were to develop an aggressive attitude, all the weight at our disposal would be thrown into the balance against such a development.

Third, we continue to desire the most friendly relations with India and to consider her independence and well-being as of the greatest importance to the whole world.

Fourth, we know that India does not at present desire military aid; yet if she should at any time change her mind in this regard, we would be prepared to give any request she might make the most sympathetic consideration.

India's Attitude Toward Aid

The fourth point perhaps deserves a little explanation. Some Indians, including Prime Minister Nehru, seem to have felt that the President's suggestion regarding eventual military aid to India was uncalled for in view of previous declarations that India disapproved in principle of foreign military assistance to Asian states. The American Government was, of course, aware of this attitude and for that reason the President's letter did not make an outright offer of military aid at this time. It was deliberately phrased to recognize the current Indian policy but to make clear that, if that policy should change, the United States would be glad to discuss the same kind of collaboration with India which it now proposes to undertake with Pakistan and which it has previously undertaken with many other nations of the free world. We had hoped the Government and people of India would accept this as evidence of good will and good faith on the part of the United States. We also had hoped this would make it clear that we did not intend to arm Pakistan against India, as had been charged by some Indians.

It is probably still too early to assess definitively either the positive or the negative results of the moves which have now been begun looking toward the defense of the Middle East and South Asia. I should like to say, however, that I believe the advantages will far outweigh the disadvantages both for the nations of that area and for the United States and its associates of the free world.

I do not think for one minute that we have destroyed our friendly relations with India. It is recognized that the two countries—India and the United States—follow different routes to the same objective. As India sees that what we do has no harmful effects on her or on world security, I cannot help but feel that her Government and people will lose their apprehensions. In other spheres I expect that the United States and India will continue as before to work together. We must do what we can to insure that collaboration in the economic, cultural, and social fields is strengthened. Above all, we cannot allow ourselves a policy of exasperation because India pursues a path which varies from our own.

One word of caution may be in order. There has been much loose talk of alliances in connection

with American aid to Pakistan and the Turk-Pakistani collaboration. No such binding arrangements are contemplated. As stated in the communique which they have issued, the Governments of Turkey and Pakistan plan only to study methods of collaboration in fields in which they have mutual interests. The supply of American military equipment to Pakistan will be based solely on the normal mutual-security agreement, which does not commit either Pakistan or the United States to any military obligations other than those very general obligations already cited, to refrain from aggression and to be prepared to assist in their own defense and the defense of the free world. We have signed similar agreements with many countries without any suggestion that those countries necessarily become allies of the United States or subservient to the United States.

Effect of Turkey-Pakistan Initiative

At the same time, I believe that a real step forward has been made toward insuring lasting peace and security for the Middle East and South Asia, through an indigenous movement toward cooperation between the nations of the area, with the assistance, as desired, of the United States and its allies. We should most certainly be encouraged by the initiative which has been taken by Turkey and Pakistan. This initiative is only a beginning, but it may produce far-reaching results. It is significant that the two countries have indicated that accession to the agreement which they propose to negotiate will be open to other like-minded nations. It goes without saying that the United States would be glad to see other states of the area join in this cooperative relationship, in their own good time and when and if they themselves become convinced that it is in their interest.

It is not too much to hope that what we are witnessing today may eventually result in a general strengthening of the whole Middle East.

Disunity produces weakness. Unity contributes to strength. If the Middle Eastern nations can find it within themselves to move forward together in a common cause of peace and security, I think that their new unity and strength may well overcome many of the basic causes of instability and dissension. With some outside help and encouragement, they can realize great progress toward viable economies. They can look forward to social advancements. They will have the means to protect effectively their individual security.

Above all, they will be making a great contribution to the security of the free world.

Hungarian Plane Case in International Court of Justice

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 111 dated March 5

As announced at the International Court of Justice at The Hague on March 3, 1954, the U.S. Government filed with that Court applications instituting proceedings against the Soviet and Hungarian Governments on account of their conduct in connection with the four American airmen who came down on Hungarian soil in a U.S. C-47 military aircraft November 19, 1951.

As annexes to the applications there were transmitted copies of the formal diplomatic notes delivered to the Soviet and Hungarian Governments by the U.S. Government on March 17, 1953,¹ and the replies received from the Soviet and Hungarian Governments. The applications, the Department of State is informed, have been duly transmitted by the registrar of the International Court of Justice to the respondent Governments and are being transmitted to all governments entitled to appear before the Court as required by the rules of the Court.

In filing its applications with the International Court of Justice, the U.S. Government gave careful consideration to the fact that the Soviet and Hungarian Governments had not submitted to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and had not responded to the U.S. Government's invitation, contained in its notes of March 17, 1953, either to enter into a special agreement with the U.S. Government submitting these cases to the Court or to file with that Court declarations accepting the Court's jurisdiction for this dispute. Instead, in a note of June 19, 1953, replying to this Government's note of March 17, 1953, the Soviet Government, without being responsive to the charges made by the U.S. Government, stated:

The Soviet Government considers the proposal of the United States Government concerning the submission of this question to the consideration of the International Court to be without foundation since there exists no subject for such consideration and equally since there exists no basis for bringing any claims whatsoever against the Soviet Union.

¹ For a summary of these notes, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1953, p. 496.

In a note of November 2, 1953, the Hungarian Government, referring to this Government's note of March 17, 1953, stated:

... the Hungarian Government considers the case of the four American flyers as closed.

The Hungarian Government made no effort to respond to the detailed charges of the U.S. note.

While customarily, in the past, cases have been brought before the International Court of Justice under special written agreements between the disputing governments or on the basis of prior declarations by both governments accepting the Court's jurisdiction, the Court's rules and the Court's jurisprudence permit a complaining government to file an application unilaterally upon the premise that the defendant government will tacitly or by its own unilateral declaration agree to a hearing of the dispute by the International Court of Justice. This method was left open for cases where the defendant government might have been unwilling to join in any preliminary agreement with the complaining government or to file a formal declaration accepting jurisdiction in advance of the dispute itself being brought before the Court by the complaining government but where it was nevertheless willing to appear and defend a proceeding instituted against it.

The U.S. Government has exhausted the channels of diplomacy in seeking satisfaction in these cases. The U.S. Government is conscious, however, that the human rights, and international rules of conduct with respect to overflying airplanes, involved in this case, are subjects which have assumed importance in international relations. The case is one particularly suited to the institution of the International Court of Justice both as to an authoritative determination of the facts and as to a formulation of the rules of law which civilized governments should observe in these fields.

In determining to bring this matter before the International Court of Justice in this way, the Department of State has been moved by the desirability of promoting the establishment and maintenance of the rule of international law and order.

TEXT OF APPLICATION

Following is the text of the application addressed to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, Netherlands, by the Department's Legal Adviser:

FEBRUARY 16, 1954

SIR:

1. This is a written application, in accordance with the Statute and Rules of the Court, submitted by the Government of the United States of America instituting proceedings against the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of certain actions of the latter Government, in concert with the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic. A separate written application is being submitted by the Government of the United States of America simultaneously herewith instituting proceedings against the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic on account of the same matter. The Government of the United States of America requests that so far as it may be convenient and proper to do so the two applications and the proceedings thereon be considered and dealt with together.

The subject of the dispute and a succinct statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim of the Government of the United States of America is based are set forth in two notes, one delivered to the Soviet Government on March 17, 1953 and one delivered to the Hungarian Government on the same day; the note to the Hungarian Government was incorporated by reference in the note to the Soviet Government, the note to the Soviet Government was incorporated by reference in the note to the Hungarian Government, and each of the two Governments received from the United States Government a copy of the note addressed by the United States Government to the other Government. Copies of both notes are attached to this application as an annex.

2. The United States Government notes that the present dispute concerns matters of the character specified in Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the Court, including subdivisions (a) through (d). As will be seen from the annex, the legal dispute of the United States Government with the Soviet Government involves the interpretation of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Paris February 10, 1947, to which the United States Government, the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government are parties; the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, signed at Washington June 24, 1925, which was in effect during the period relevant to this dispute and to which the United States Government and the Hungarian Government are parties; numerous questions of international law, as set forth in Part II of each of the annexed notes; numerous issues of fact which if established would constitute breaches of international obligations by the Hungarian Gov-

ernment; and questions of the nature and extent of reparation to be made to the United States Government by the Hungarian Government for these breaches.

The United States Government, in filing this application with the Court, submits to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of this case. The Hungarian Government appears not to have filed any declaration with the Court thus far, and although it was invited to do so by the United States Government in the Note annexed hereto it has not made any responsive reply to the invitation. The Hungarian Government, however, is qualified to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter and may upon notification of this application by the Registrar, in accordance with the Rules of the Court, take the necessary steps to enable the Court's jurisdiction over both parties to the dispute to be confirmed.

Thus the United States Government finds the jurisdiction of this Court on the foregoing considerations and on Article 36 (1) of the Statute.

3. The claim of the Government of the United States of America is briefly that the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic in concert with and aided and abetted by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on November 19, 1951, wilfully and unlawfully caused to be seized a United States Air Force C-47 type aircraft together with its crew of four American nationals and its contents, driven over Hungary by winds unknown to the crew; that thereafter both Governments engaged in unlawful actions against the crew and against the United States with respect to the incident, constituting both serious violations of existing treaties as well as manifest denials of justice and other international wrongs. For these breaches of international obligation the United States has demanded and demands monetary and other reparation from the Hungarian Government. The Soviet Government has sought to justify some of its conduct by Article 22 of the Treaty of Peace to which reference has been made, a contention which the United States Government denies.

As the United States Government, in further pleadings herein, will more fully set forth, the United States Government proposes that the issues of law and fact in this dispute be heard and decided by the Court in accordance with its Statute and Rules; that the Court decide that the accused Governments are jointly and severally liable to the United States for the damage caused; that the Court award damages in favor of the United States Government against the Soviet Government in the sum of \$637,894.11, with interest, as demanded in the annexed notes; that the Court determine the nature and extent of other reparation and redress, which the Court may deem fit and proper; and that the Court make the necessary orders and awards, including an award of costs, to effectuate its determinations.

4. The undersigned has been appointed by the Government of the United States of America as its agent for the purpose of this application and all proceedings thereon.

Very truly yours,

HERMAN PHLEGER
*The Legal Adviser
of the
Department of State*

Review of the U.N. Charter

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U. S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The purpose of this statement is not to give final conclusions. The Executive Branch wants to await the advice of Congress, as well as the views of the American citizenry. We are also interested in the views of other nations. Of course, it is fundamental that no charter amendments can come into effect without the consent of the Senate.

Secretary Dulles has identified for you some of the principal questions that he felt your committee and the American people should be looking into so that our final policies can be the product of thoughtful and realistic study.²

Today your attention is invited to a few of the issues that seem particularly important in the light of my service as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

Before doing this, let the Administration's steadfast support of active U.S. participation in the United Nations be repeated. My own conviction, based on first-hand experience, is that our participation is clearly required by our national interests, both short-term and long-range, and that the review conference should not be allowed to jeopardize the good we have already worked so hard to build up. President Eisenhower recently said of the United Nations that "it still represents man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield," and he characterized it as "sheer necessity."³

Misuse of Veto

I. Let me begin by commending to your study the recommendations the Senate made to the Executive in the Vandenberg resolution of 1948,⁴ and which represent the policy of this Administration.

¹ Made before the Charter Review Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 3 (press release 104).

² BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1954, p. 170.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1953, p. 457.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1948, p. 79.

This is the proposal that the Charter be amended to eliminate the veto: (a) on the admission of new members and (b) on the pacific settlement of disputes.

Of course when we think about it we see that our interests and our security require that we retain the final say on anything involving the use of American forces. This means the right to use the veto.

a. But on the matter of membership, 14 deserving nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of Soviet Russia's abuse of the veto power in the Security Council. These are Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Eire, Finland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, and Viet-Nam.

You would be well advised therefore to take a new look at article 4 on membership qualifications, in conjunction with article 27 on the veto, in seeing what this country might propose to change this unfortunate situation.

b. Neither should one nation possess the right to veto pacific settlements of disputes. Sometimes these settlements have been laboriously arrived at by nations working in good faith and then thrown out of the window by one troublemaker. A few weeks ago, in the last case handled by the Security Council for instance—the dispute between Syria and Israel—a veto on a proposed course of settlement favored by a majority of members was the Soviet Union's only contribution.⁵

Organizational Structure of U.N. System

II. The second question which is deserving of thought is the overall organizational structure of the United Nations system, by which I mean the United Nations proper plus the various specialized agencies such as WHO, ILO, ICAO, FAO, UNESCO, and so forth. These specialized agencies are entirely outside of my jurisdiction and I have no responsibility for their operation. And of course the review conference we are talking about involves only the United Nations Charter. But under articles 17, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 66, 70, 91, and 96, there is a definite although limited relationship. The United Nations arranges for creation of specialized agencies; it gets reports from them; it does work for them; they sit without vote in United Nations meetings; and, most important, the specialized agencies come into a contractual relationship with the United Nations itself. The United Nations is supposed to make recommendations for coordination of their policies and activities.

Now a certain amount of formal coordination does exist. For example, there are some formal agreements which aim at creating contacts between the United Nations and the 10 existing agencies. The United Nations does consider their reports

⁵ *Ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 297.

each year and generally makes recommendations to one or more of them. Their budgets are examined each year by the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. And the United Nations Secretary-General does preside over a committee on administrative coordination consisting of the directors of the agencies.

But speaking frankly and realistically, the specialized agencies are, for practical purposes, independent. This has been the source of many troubles. In past years, for example, the publicity coming from one specialized agency had a significant and understandably irritating effect on a sizeable number of Americans, with reactions which damaged the United Nations proper and which prejudiced some of the fine work actually being done by the specialized agencies. Screening of U.S. employees of international organizations, to give another example, even though the agreement of the United Nations Secretary-General was obtained, had to be negotiated separately with each agency—an immensely time-consuming procedure. I therefore would raise with you the question as to whether the present provisions of the United Nations Charter are adequate for the sort of coordination we want and, if not, whether the system of coordination should be improved, and, if so, by changes in the Charter.

U.N. Support by Members

While charter review is important and could do a great deal to make the United Nations more effective, we should never lose sight of the fact that the success of the United Nations in the last analysis will always depend on the extent to which its members support it when the going gets rough. In my opinion, no amount of words and clever diplomatic gestures can obscure this fact.

The contribution of the United States in Korea was of overwhelming importance and reflects great credit on us. In the war in Korea, member states of the United Nations, other than the United States, contributed the equivalent of two divisions which, when compared with the enormous contribution of the United States, does not seem very much, even though it is far better than nothing and even though it saved the United States the expense of putting up two more divisions of our own which, incidentally, repaid us our assessed contribution to the United Nations many times over. But there is no doubt in my mind that if United States officials at that time had not required states having valuable manpower to reimburse us in dollars for the supplies which we provided them, we might well have had perhaps as much as three

divisions more. But naturally, nations not having mechanized equipment, not having shipping, and not having dollars were unable to undertake to supply equipment, shipping, and dollars which they did not possess. This had the effect of reducing the foreign troop contribution.

In World War II, the Congress rightly provided that it was advantageous for the United States to provide Russian and French soldiers, for example, with clothing and equipment for the very simple reason that this tended to save the lives of American soldiers and to hasten the victory. It is a mysterious sort of logic which maintains that the American man who was fighting in Korea was not entitled to as much help as his older brother was in World War II.

I can assure you that under the policy of this Administration this situation will not be repeated. The President's policy is that, while in principle each nation involved in a United Nations effort to repel an aggression should equip and supply its own troops to the extent that it is able, the overriding consideration should be the maximum contribution of effective manpower. When any such nation is willing to contribute effective manpower but not able to provide for logistic support, the Department of Defense should furnish to such nation military equipment, supplies, and services, without requirement of payment to the extent that the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation cannot reasonably be expected to pay. A nation capable of contributing money beyond the support of any forces furnished by it should of course be encouraged also to contribute toward the logistic support of the forces of other nations. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.

To conclude: The work you are doing here can be of prime importance in helping the American people to study these issues intelligently and soberly. President Eisenhower has said that this Government is "committed irrevocably to the support of the United Nations." In his historic address last April 16, he pledged that the United States is ready in the future, as it has been in the past, to help "make of the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples."⁶ With these two statements as our text, the United States can provide the sort of enlightened leadership which the people of the world hopefully seek.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 602.

Administration of Tanganyika

*Statement by Mason Sears
U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 9

Up to now the Council has been dealing with West Africa, where progress toward self-government is making political history. Today we turn to Tanganyika in East Africa, several thousand miles away.

Here we find very different but equally challenging circumstances in the march of a territory toward self-determination. Here some of the most attractive peoples in the world are closing the gap which has separated them so long from life in other continents.

In giving our views on this territory we wish to start with a statement by Secretary Dulles. It was made in Venezuela last week. "The United States," he said, "recognizes that . . . freedom and independence [are] based not only on political and moral considerations but also on economic and social well-being."²

These words are made to order for present-day Tanganyika, where social and economic progress are the cornerstones of political advancement. In this territory social and economic development is closely tied to better housing and better pay for its growing labor population.

It also happens that unusually significant developments took place in both these fields within the year. In the field of housing we understand that in Dar Es Salaam a new process for building low-cost, hygienic houses was successfully developed. These houses, which are made of treated clay and concrete, are said to rent at the extremely low rate of less than \$1 per month per room. Nearly 2,000 of them have already been erected.

This new building process will be twice welcome if it prevents the appearance in Tanganyika of those huge industrial shack towns which are breeding crime and racial violence in other parts of Africa.

In the field of economics the important sisal industry of Tanganyika has started a pension system for its African workers. This offers the worker a lifetime job and permanent settlement on an industrial estate with a garden large enough to raise the basic food for his family. In return it gives industry a trained workman who is willing to put in a full day's work.

Previously, the African laborer was given little or no incentive. All he wanted was to work long enough to earn his small hut tax. Then he went back to his hut in the bushes.

¹ Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 9.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 380.

This shifting back and forth between job and bush and the consequent low productivity of labor is described by some as a part of the "rhythm of Africa."

For our part, we do not believe this to be a fair description. And what is more, we understand that the sisal industry itself is beginning to regard the low productivity of Africans as just a natural result of the mistake of management in failing to provide an incentive for its workers.

Mr. President, we have mentioned only housing and wages. We might have mentioned more, but these serve our purpose. They show that Tanganyika is becoming a laboratory for successful experiments which are greatly benefiting its nearly 8 million people and even those beyond its borders. For this, the British administrators deserve great credit.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Military Bases in the Philippines. TIAS 2739. Pub. 5118. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, implementing agreement of Mar. 14, 1947, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila Dec. 29, 1952.

Agriculture, Cooperative Program in Ecuador. TIAS 2740. Pub. 5127. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador, superseding agreement of Jan. 26 and Apr. 16, 1948. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito May 29, 1952.

Military Obligations of Certain Persons Having Dual Nationality. TIAS 2741. Pub. 5128. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and France, amending agreement of Dec. 22, 1948. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington Nov. 18 and Dec. 31, 1952.

Economic Cooperation. TIAS 2742. Pub. 5129. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Turkey, amending agreement of July 4, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara Dec. 30, 1952.

Germany, Industrial Controls. TIAS 2765. Pub. 5131. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France, amending agreement of Apr. 3, 1951, as amended—Signed at Bonn-Mehlem Dec. 31, 1952.

Technical Cooperation, Industrial Apprenticeship Training Program. TIAS 2748. Pub. 5142. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro June 30, 1952.

Extending the Long Range Proving Ground for the Testing of Guided Missiles. TIAS 2425. Pub. 5144. 24 pp. World Aeronautical Chart. 30¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic—Signed at Ciudad Trujillo Nov. 26, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ciudad Trujillo Nov. 26, 1951.

International Traffic in Arms. Regulations Issued on November 25, 1953, by the Secretary of State, Governing Registration and Licensing Under Section 12 of the Joint Resolution Approved November 4, 1939, and Related Laws. Ninth edition. Pub. 5221. General Foreign Policy Series 83. 30 pp. 20¢.

The regulations contained in this pamphlet supersede, as of January 1, 1954, all previous regulations administered by the Secretary of State governing the international traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war and other munitions of war.

Our Foreign Policy in Latin America. Four Speeches. Pub. 5285. Inter-American Series 46. 17 pp. 15¢.

This pamphlet contains the following speeches: Falcón Dam—A Monument to Inter-American Cooperation by President Eisenhower; Inter-American Cooperation and Hemisphere Solidarity by John M. Cabot, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Strengthening Inter-American Ties by John M. Cabot; Economic Growth and Human Welfare in the Western Hemisphere by Nelson A. Rockefeller, Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Report to the President. United States-Latin American Relations. Pub. 5290. Inter-American Series 47. 23 pp. 15¢.

This is a report to the President by Milton S. Eisenhower, Special Ambassador, and highlights the importance of Latin America and the United States to each other.

Atomic Power for Peace. An address by President Eisenhower. Pub. 5314. General Foreign Policy Series 85. 14 pp. 10¢.

This booklet shows how the "miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." The address was made before the General Assembly of the United Nations December 8, 1953.

Agriculture—Cooperative Program in Peru—Additional Financial Contributions. TIAS 2743. Pub. 5130. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima January 24 and February 22, 1952.

Aviation—Flights of Military Aircraft. TIAS 2502. Pub. 5153. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Honduras. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tegucigalpa January 22, March 20, and April 23, 1952.

Defense—Communications Facilities in Newfoundland. TIAS 2508. Pub. 5154. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa November 4 and 8, 1952.

Military Assistance—Constabulary Equipment for Indonesia. TIAS 2768. Pub. 5157. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Indonesia,

amending agreement of August 15, 1950. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington January 5, 1953, and at Djakarta January 12, 1953.

Agricultural Experimentation Program. TIAS 2770. Pub. 5159. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru, extending agreement of April 1, and 9, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima January 13 and 26, 1953.

Relief Supplies and Packages—Reimbursement of Ocean Freight Charges. TIAS 2749. Pub. 5168. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and China. Exchange of notes—Dated at Taipei October 20 and December 12, 1952.

Relief From Taxation on Defense Expenditures. TIAS 2477. Pub. 5233. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo July 14 and 25, 1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Reciprocal Procurement Rights for Military Supplies or Services. TIAS 2480. Pub. 5258. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden. Exchange of notes—Signed at Stockholm June 30 and July 1, 1952.

Naval Mission to Ecuador. TIAS 2478. Pub. 5257. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador extending agreement of December 12, 1940, as modified and extended—Signed at Washington Feb. 7 and Apr. 18, 1951.

Technical Cooperation. TIAS 2479. Pub. 5260. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Signed at Cairo May 5, 1951; and exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo Feb. 21 and 25, 1952.

Assignment of Air Force Liaison Officers to Mexico. TIAS 2482. Pub. 5325. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico extending agreement of July 5, 1949; Effected by exchange of notes—Signed at Washington Sept. 4 and Oct. 19, 1951.

Mutual Security—Assurances Under Mutual Security Act of 1951. TIAS 2613. Pub. 5147. 5 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Laos—Dated at Vientiane Dec. 18 and 31, 1951.

Technical Cooperation—Assurances Under Mutual Security Act of 1951. TIAS 2626. Pub. 5185. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro Jan. 8, 1952.

Technical Cooperation—Assurances Under Mutual Security Act of 1951. TIAS 2631. Pub. 5182. 7 pp. 10¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and El Salvador—Signed at San Salvador Dec. 11, 1951, and Jan. 7, 1952 with related note—Signed Jan. 25, 1952.

Technical Cooperation—Economic Development. TIAS 2637. Pub. 5167. 9 pp. 10¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Iran—Signed at Tehran Jan. 19 and 20, 1952, and exchange of notes—Dated Jan. 4 and 5, 1952.

Technical Cooperation—Assurances Under Mutual Security Act of 1951. TIAS 2638. Pub. 5181. 4 pp. 5¢.

Exchange of notes between the United States and Iraq—Dated at Baghdad Dec. 18, 1951, and Feb. 21, 1952.

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Press releases issued prior to March 8 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 104 of March 3, 107 of March 4, 111 and 113 of March 5, and 114 of March 6.

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†117	3/8	Communique on agreement with Japan
†118	3/8	Text of Mda agreement with Japan
†119	3/8	Allison: Signing of agreement
120	3/8	Dutch ratification of Edc protocol
121	3/8	Dulles: Statement at Caracas
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†129	3/10	Migrant labor agreement
130	3/12	Dulles: Communist intervention
131	3/13	Belgian action on Edc
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* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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